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Abstract
This Comment examines the fruition of the U.S. Treasury Department’s efforts to forestall
third-country residents’ avoidance of U.S. taxation on transatlantic investments through interme-
diary companies. Part I sets forth multinational corporations’ penchant for interposing entities
in the Netherlands and the multifarious endeavors implemented to curb abusive treaty practices.
Part I also discusses the unilateral legislative provisions that expedited, and the bilateral tax treaty
provision that shaped, the U.S.-Dutch negotiations. Part II describes the detailed requirements
enumerated in the extensive limitation on benefits provision of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty. Part
III argues that Article 26 strengthens the international community’s commitment to effecting tax
treaties and serves to rightfully compel treaty shoppers to relinquish propitious tax treatment, while
ensuring treaty benefits to bona fide residents of the Netherlands. Part III also contends that the
Convention escapes contravention of European unification and provides U.S. negotiators with an
opportunity to forge an authoritative tax treaty policy. This Comment concludes that the revo-
lutionary bilateral accord effectuates future U.S. tax conventions, sustains the U.S. tax base, and
severely hinders the use of Dutch holding companies as investment vehicles for the procurement
of benefits under the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty.
THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS INCOME TAX TREATY:
CLOSING THE DOORS ON THE TREATY SHOPPERS
INTRODUCTION
The post-World War II community has witnessed a marked
proliferation in financial activity that traverses every nation's bor-
ders.' Multinational corporations, with profits exceeding the
gross domestic products of several countries,2 continue to ex-
pand, distributing capital and resources through ensconced
channels of global subsidiaries.3 The emergence of intricate
transnational investments poses formidable policy issues for the
world's many independent taxing jurisdictions.4
These sovereignties, seeking international economic growth
and the reduction of double taxation5 on their citizens, have en-
tered into numerous income tax treaties.6 The tax conventions
1. Mimi E. Gild, Tax Treaty Shopping: Changes in the U.S. Approach to Limitation on
Benefits Provisions in Developing Country Treaties, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 553, 553 (1990) (dis-
cussing substantial growth in worldwide trade). Since the 1950's, the flow of investment
into and out of the United States has grown rapidly, generating extensive integration in
the manufacturing, services, trade, and investment industries. Id.; see CHARLES H. Gus-
TAFSON & RICHARD C. PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: 1991-1993 12-
15 (1991) (providing data that evinces magnitude of international transactions).
2. JANET LowE, THE SECRET EMPIRE: How 25 MULTINATIONALS RULE THE WORLD 5
(1992). The United States, Japan, U.S.S.R. (former), France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and Canada are the only nations, out of a total of 213, that report
gross domestic products larger than the assets of the world's leading banks. Id.
3. Gus Tyler, The Nation State vs. The Global Economy, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at
30 (analyzing rise of transnational corporation). Multinational corporate organizations
consist of smaller entities that incorporate and operate in many different nations. Gus-
TAFSON & PUGH, supra note 1, at 11.
4. See GUSTA SON & PUGH, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing complications in taxation
that have arisen due to operations of multinational enterprises); H. David Rosenbloom,
Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 LAw & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 763, 764 (1983) (noting
that policymakers must delicately balance long-term tax policy goals with acceptable
practices in international trade and commerce).
5. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMM. ON Fis.
CAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 7
(1977) [hereinafter 1977 OECD MODEL] (containing text of model with commentary).
Double taxation is "the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the
same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods .... " Id.
6. See Robert J. Rolfe & Timothy S. Doupnik, The United States Attempts to Crack
Down on Treaty Shopping, 38 TAX EXECUTIVE 325, 325 (1986). The principle goal of tax
treaties is the removal of the negative effects of double taxation on the international
movement of goods, services, capital, and people. See 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 5,
at 7; Extract of the Report of the Financial Committee to the Council of the League of Nations,
League of Nations, Doc. C.368 M.115 1925 IIA, at 1 (1925) (urging future drafters of
tax conventions to consider "the disadvantage of placing any obstacles in the way of the
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govern when, and to what extent, a resident of one country is
subject to taxation in another country. Although the bilateral
agreements explicitly prescribe the parties entitled to treaty ben-
efits,8 third-country residents9 have secured favorable tax treat-
ment via treaty shopping.'
The United States, through unilateral and bilateral actions,
has manifested its appetency for eradicating" premeditated ef-
forts that take advantage of the international tax network. 12 In
international circulation of capital, which is one of the conditions of public prosperity
and world economic reconstruction"). Income tax treaties have been most effective at
affording taxpayers mutuality of relief. See Vincent P. Belotsky, Jr., The Prevention of Tax
Havens Via Income Tax Treaties, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 43, 62 (1987) (discussing history,
use, and importance of income tax treaties). A tax treaty is also a productive medium
for resolution of disputes, prevention of fiscal evasion, accommodation of differing tax
systems, avoidance of excessive taxation, exchange of information, and advancement of
a country's economic and foreign policy. Id. But see David S. Foster, The Importance of
Tax Treaties, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 565 (1982) (noting lack of unanimity in
support of tax treaties). Opponents contend that scarce governmental resources are
wasted on negotiating and maintaining a treaty network that is continually outdated,
thereby opening loopholes that invite treaty abuse. Id. at 565.
7. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 770 (describing tax treaties as jurisdictional
documents). Tax treaties originated as an integral role in the commerce between na-
tions. Belotsky, supra note 6, at 62.
8. See, e.g., Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty,June 16, 1981, art. 1,
1 1, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 211, at 10,573 [hereinafter 1981 U.S. Model
Treaty]. The 1981 U.S. Model Treaty explicitly states that "[t] his Convention shall apply
to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States, except as other-
wise provided in the Convention," Id. The addition of "except as otherwise provided"
in tax conventions is significant. Mary C. Bennett & Philip D. Morrison et al., A Com-
mentaiy to the United States Netherlands Tax Convention, in THE 1992 UNITED STATES-
NETHER-ANDS TAX CONVENTION 3, 4 (Baker & McKenzie, Kluwer Law & Taxation 1993).
For example, information exchange provisions affect entities who are not residents of
one of the treaty nations, while limitation on benefits articles frustrate residents' entitle-
ment to benefits. Id.
9. Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 766. Third-country resident refers to an entity
that is not a citizen of one of the treaty signatories. Id.
10. See Rolfe & Doupnik, supra note 6, at 325 (defining treaty shopping as process
of creating corporations in particular countries strictly to take advantage of favorable
tax treaty system). Treaty shopping generally refers to "the use by a national of a coun-
try with which the United States does not have an income tax treaty of an entity formed
under the laws of a U.S. treaty partner to reduce or eliminate source-country (U.S.)
taxes." Leslie J. Schreyer & Sean Mitts, Limitations on Treaty Shopping With Respect to
Dividends and Non-Portfolio Interest, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1988,
405, 405 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. J4-3618,
1988).
11. But see Schreyer & Mitts, supra note 10, at 405 (discussing theory that treaty
shopping reduces U.S. effective tax rate for third-country residents, thereby giving U.S.
businesses advantage in attracting capital).
12. See One Treaty at a Time, Says International Tax Counsel, I J. INT'L TAx'N 40, 41
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furtherance of this goal, the U.S. Treasury Department has em-
barked on an aggressive campaign to renegotiate those treaties
that permit third-country residents to successfully avoid all tax
on U.S. income."3 U.S. negotiators mandate that U.S. tax trea-
ties include a limitation on benefits provision that requires a
company to establish a sufficient nexus with the residence-
country before obtaining reduced withholding tax rates from
the source-country."
The 1948 United States-Netherlands Convention with re-
spect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes (the "1948
Treaty")1" represented one of the last, and probably the most
notorious, U.S. tax treaties that accorded third-country residents
(1990) (interviewing International Tax Counsel at U.S. Department of Treasury). The
U.S. Treasury Department's policy is that every tax treaty should include an anti-treaty
shopping article. Id. Alternatively, the United States may override international in-
come tax treaties through the enactment of domestic legislation. See Richard L.
Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: The Branch Profits Tax and Congres-
sional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAx LAw. 173 (1989) (examining relationship between
treaty commitments and domestic legislation).
13. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON TAX CONVENTION (AND
PROTOCOL) WITH THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, S. EXEC. REPT. No. 19, 103d
Cong., 1st. Sess. 18 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-NETH. REPORT] (noting that over past 30
years, U.S. Treasury Department has sought to amend tax treaties to cure abuses). Fail-
ure to cooperate in renegotiations may persuade the United States to unilaterally can-
cel treaties, as it did with the British Virgin Islands in 1982 and the Netherlands Antilles
in 1987. William W. Bell & David B. Shoemaker, International Developments, 6J. PARTNER-
SHIP TAX'N 79, 85-86 nn.27-28 (1989). Tax treaty changes, unilateral cancellations, and
legislative overrides by the U.S. Congress leave the corporate structure of non-residen-
tial aliens in a vulnerable position. Id. at 85 n.27.
14. See Belotsky, supra note 6, at 83 (discussing that curtailment of treaty shopping
is achieved in tax treaties by including limitation on benefits clause). Distributions of
dividends, interest, and royalties from a U.S. subsidiary to its parent corporation in
another country will generally be subject to a 30% withholding tax. See I.R.C.
§§ 871(a), 881(a). Unless otherwise stated, all code references are to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986, as amended. The dividends, interest, and royalties are earned by a
subsidiary in one country, the source-country, but owned by a parent company that is a
resident of another, the residence-country. Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of Int'l
Tax'n, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1152 (1981).
15. See Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes,
Apr. 29, 1948, U.S.-Neth., 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855 [hereinafter 1948 Treaty], as
modified by Convention Modifying and Supplementing the Netherlands Convention,
Dec. 30, 1965, U.S.-Neth., 17 U.S.T. 891, T.I.A.S. No. 6051. The position of the Nether-
lands as both the third largest source of direct investment into the United States and
the destination of considerable outbound investment by U.S. corporations has been
attributed to the 1948 Treaty. See Philip D. Morrison & Mary C. Bennett, The New U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty: Part I- Limitation on Benefits and Related Issues, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 331,
331 (1993) (discussing likelihood of correlation between 1948 Treaty and substantial
Dutch investment in United States).
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a permissible tax avoidance configuration when structuring U.S.
investments. 6 The absence of a limitation on benefits clause in
the 1948 Treaty triggered exhaustive negotiations 17  that
culminated in the long-awaited United States-Netherlands Con-
vention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-
tion of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (the
"U.S.-Netherlands Treaty" or "Convention").18 The successful
16. See Morrison & Bennett, supra note 15, at 331 (ascribing presence of tax avoid-
ance activities in Netherlands to absence of anti-treaty shopping provision in 1948
Treaty). The primary function of tax conventions is to promote the exchange of goods
and services and the movement of capital and persons. See supra note 6 (discussing
ability of tax treaty to alleviate negative effects of double taxation); Gild, supra note 1, at
559 (adding that second major objective is to combat international tax evasion and
avoidance schemes). Tax avoidance, in contrast to the willful and deliberate violation
of the law essential for tax evasion, pertains to "persons [who] arrange their affairs in
such a way as to take advantage of weaknesses or ambiguities in the law to reduce the
tax payable below what it would otherwise be, without actually breaking the law." U.N.
DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MANUAL FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF BILAT-
ERAL TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 22, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/94, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XVI.3 (1979) [hereinafter U.N. MANUAL]. But see
Belotsky, supra note 6, at 50 (noting that definitions of tax evasion and avoidance can
cause unclear distinctions); see also RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE By
UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS - AN OVERVIEW 60-61 (1981) (abandoning use of these two
terms and creating four categories that range from "completely legal" to "fraud"). This
Comment focuses on tax avoidance rather than tax evasion.
17. Fred C. de Hosson, Introduction, in THE 1992 UNITED STATES-NETHERLANDS TAX
CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1, 1. The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty is the result of more
than twenty years of negotiations. Id. The first round of substantive talks began in
September 1988. Bell & Shoemaker, supra note 13, at 85 n.30. For a discussion of issues
facing drafters of tax treaties, see generally Rosenbloom, supra note 4 (surveying history
of U.S. tax treaties and U.S. model conventions to identify most troublesome theoreti-
cal and technical problems of treaty drafting); Stanley S. Surrey, International Tax Con-
ventions: How They Operate and What They Accomplish, 23J. TAX'N 364 (1965) (discussing
impulses behind tax treaty negotiations).
18. Convention between the United States of America and The Kingdom of the
Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 462 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Neth. Treaty].
The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty entered into force on January 1, 1994, Tax Treaties: U.S.
Exchanges Diplomatic Notes on Dutch Protocol, Slovak Tax Treaty in 1993, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 2, at G-2 (Jan. 4, 1994). Taxpayers may elect to extend the application of the
1948 Treaty for an additional 12 months. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra, art. 37, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 6, at 98-99, 32 I.L.M. at 503-04. Ratification in 1993 was not guaranteed. See
Kathleen Matthews, US. and the Netherlands Will Prepare Separate Technical Explanations of
New Treaty, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 443, 443 (1993). In the United States, the Treasury
Department's technical explanation served as the guideline for the report and recom-
mendation issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the full Senate. Id.; see
U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at I (recommending that U.S. Senate consent to
ratification). In the Netherlands, an explanatory memorandum, prepared by the Minis-
try of Finance, was first submitted with the Convention to the Raad van Staat for its
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denouement on December 18, 1992, engendered an intricate
limitation on benefits provision, provided in Article 26,19 which
is reflective of the increasing detail contained in international
tax conventions. 20
This Comment examines the fruition of the U.S. Treasury
Department's efforts to forestall third-country residents' avoid-
ance of U.S. taxation on transatlantic investments through inter-
mediary companies. Part I sets forth multinational corporations'
penchant for interposing entities in the Netherlands and the
multifarious endeavors implemented to curb abusive treaty prac-
tices. Part I also discusses the unilateral legislative provisions
that expedited, and the bilateral tax treaty provision that shaped,
the U.S.-Dutch negotiations. Part II describes the detailed re-
quirements enumerated in the extensive limitation on benefits
provision of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty. Part III argues that Ar-
ticle 26 strengthens the international community's commitment
to effecting tax treaties and serves to rightfully compel treaty
shoppers to relinquish propitious tax treatment, while ensuring
treaty benefits to bona fide residents of the Netherlands. Part III
also contends that the Convention escapes contravention of Eu-
ropean unification and provides U.S. negotiators with an oppor-
tunity to forge an authoritative tax treaty policy. This Comment
concludes that the revolutionary bilateral accord effectuates fu-
ture U.S. tax conventions, sustains the U.S. tax base, and severely
hinders the use of Dutch holding companies as investment vehi-
cles for the procurement of benefits under the U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT ABUSIVE
TREATY PRACTICES
International tax avoidance is not a recent phenomenon.2 '
advice, and subsequently delivered to the Netherlands Parliament for its express con-
sent. See Matthews, supra, at 443.
19. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, S. TREAv Doc. No. 6, at 59, 32
I.L.M. at 486; Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 68 (concluding that Article 26 has
"flexibility and relative predictability of application" to accord benefits of Convention to
bona fide residents).
20. Paul H. Sleurink & Richard E. Andersen, Benefits UnderNew U.S.-Dutch Treaty are
Limited &y Complicated Tests, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 212, 212 (1993) (noting "trend towards
increasing specificity in international taxation treaties").
21. GORDON, supra note 16, at 21. International tax avoidance is not new to the
United States. Id.
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Treaty shopping,22 though a contemporary expression,23 was
practiced long before the term's conception.2 4 The 1945 U.S.
bilateral accord with the United Kingdom (the "U.S.-U.K.
Treaty") was the first U.S. tax convention to incorporate anti-
treaty shopping language. 25 The conspicuous omission of a limi-
tation on benefits clause in the 1948 Treaty,26 in connection with
Dutch tax law and the extensive network of Dutch tax accords,
invited treaty abuse by third-country multinationals.2 7 The im-
plementation of Article 26, in the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, re-
flects the aftermath of the continual development of anti-treaty
shopping provisions in U.S. legislation, the U.S. tax treaty net-
In 1721, the American colonies shifted their trade to Latin America in order
to avoid paying duties imposed by England. The tax morality which developed
from this avoidance of English duties has been described as follows: 'The fact
that the colonists were constantly evading the navigation acts, and made no
pretense of paying the duties imposed by England must have had a demoraliz-
ing effect, and taught them to evade duties imposed by their own lawmakers
Id. (citation omitted).
22. See HELMUT BECKER'& FELIXJ. WuRM, SURVEY, in TREATY SHOPPING: AN EMERG-
ING TAx ISSUE AND ITS PRESENT STATUS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1, 2 (1988) (discussing
derivation of treaty shopping). The pejorative nature of treaty shopping is analogous to
the negative connotation attached to the U.S. civil procedure term, forum shopping.
Id. Forum shopping occurs "when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particu-
lar court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 655 (6th ed. 1990).
23. BECKER & WURM, supra note 22, at 2. The term, treaty shopping, originates
from the Congressional Hearings on Offshore Tax Havens, held in April 1971. Id.
24. See id. (stating that "problem dates back some time before 1971); supra note 21
(discussing international tax avoidance practices in American colonies).
25. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1945, U.S.-U.K., 60 Stat. 1377,
T.I.A.S. No. 1546 [hereinafter 1945 U.S.-U.K. Treaty]; Rolfe & Doupnik, supra note 6, at
335 (denoting 1945 U.S.-U.K. Treaty as earliest attempt to address third-country abuse).
In 1932, the first general U.S. tax treaty was signed with France. H. David Rosenbloom
& Stanley I. Langbein, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
359, 374 (1981); see Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Income, Apr. 27, 1932, U.S.-Fr., 49 Stat. 3145, T.I.A.S. No. 885.
26. See 1948 U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 15; Kenneth H. Kral & Jack N. Serota,
New U.S.-Netherlands Treaty May Adversely Affect Netherlands Holding Company Structures, 24
TAX ADVISER 442, 442 (1993) (acknowledging lack of anti-treaty shopping provision in
1948 Treaty). This absence fueled the U.S. Treasury Department's efforts to renegoti-
ate this bilateral pact. See One Treaty at a Time, supra note 12, at 41 (discussing absence
of treaty shopping provision in 1948 Treaty as principal reason for renegotiation).
27. See Kral & Serota, supra note 26, at 442 (discussing attractiveness of Nether-
lands as location for holding companies of third-country multinational corporations);
U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at 18 (explaining susceptibility of Netherlands to
treaty abuse).
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work, and the various model tax conventions.28
A. Treaty Shopping Under the 1948 Treaty
Treaty shopping generally occurs when third-country resi-
dents generate income in the source-country, obtain treaty bene-
fits in the residence-country, and ultimately receive the income
at a low overall tax CoSt. 29 This practice contravenes the inten-
tions of the treaty signatories (the "Contracting States") .30 The
1948 Treaty did not address abuse by treaty shoppers,31 and con-
sequently, was transformed from a bilateral treaty into a multilat-
eral treaty, offering benefits to citizens throughout the world.32
28. See, e.g., 1977 OECD MODEL, supra note 5; Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, July 23, 1992,
reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 191, at 10,503 [hereinafter 1992 OECD Model];
Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, May 17, 1977, reprinted in 1 Tax Trea-
ties (CCH) 208, at 10,539 [hereinafter 1977 U.S. Model Treaty]; 1981 U.S. Model
Treaty, supra note 8, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 211, at 10,573; U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L Eco-
NOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRs, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVEL-
OPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3
(1980).
29. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 766 (describing repatriation of income to
third-country investor, through residence-country, as "prototype situation"). The third-
country resident, the ultimate owner of the income, does not reside in the source-coun-
try or the residence-country. Id. There are three basic structures that enable compa-
nies to engage in treaty shopping: direct conduit companies, stepping stone compa-
nies, and bilateral relations. BECKER & WURM, supra note 22, at 4-5. Successful treaty
shopping generally entails the presence of three factors: (1) a reduction of source-
country taxation; (2) a low or zero effective rate of tax in the residence-country; and (3)
a low or zero rate of tax on payments from the residence-country to the taxpayer. See
GORDON, supra note 16, at 158.
30. Gild, supra note 1, at 560 (discussing that treaty shoppers qualify for benefits in
unintended ways). Four main approaches are used in tax conventions to prevent treaty
shopping. See Henk P.J. Goossen, Limiting Treaty Benefits, 20 INT'L TAX J. 14, 21-22
(1993) (discussing look through, exclusion, subject-to-tax, and channel approaches). A
fifth approach, abstinence, recommends that countries refrain from negotiating tax
treaties with tax havens. Id. at 22.
31. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing absence of anti-treaty
shopping provision in 1948 Treaty).
32. See Morrison & Bennett, supra note 15, at 332 (stating that 1948 Treaty became
treaty with whole world); Doernberg, supra note 12, at 174 (discussing that treaty shop-
ping reduces "benefits of bilateral tax treaties born out of unique economic, political,
and social considerations"). But see Nicholas S. Freud, Treaty Shopping and the 1981
United States. Treasury Draft Model Income Tax Treaty, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
627, 627 (1983) (commenting that negative stereotype of treaty shopping is not univer-
sally accepted). "Some consider treaty shopping to serve a permissible policy purpose
of attracting foreign capital to the United States .... " Id.
1994] THE U.S.-NETHERL4.NDS INCOME TAX TREATY 783
1. Treaty Shoppers Find Refuge in the Netherlands
Third-country investors' predilection for the Netherlands
can be ascribed to their unremitting pursuit of tax abatements. 3
Financial planners worldwide, coveting U.S. tax advantages, *
availed themselves of the 1948 Treaty 5 and situated holdings,
headquarters, and financing companies36 in the Netherlands.3 7
Hence, the Netherlands functioned as an international invest-
ment switching center, proffering multinationals a prudent site
from which to establish a U.S. subsidiary and then receive ensu-
ing distributions.38
The popularity of the Netherlands in international tax plan-
ning schemes was not due exclusively to the 1948 Treaty.3 9 Hol-
land, with a solid financial position,4" maintains an expansive
network that extends tax benefits globally.41 In addition, the
Dutch tax authorities issue advanced tax rulings, enabling com-
33. See ERIC TOMSETT, TAX PLANNING FOR MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 34 (1989)
(discussing that Netherlands is prime location for conduit finance companies).
34. See Lori Ioannou, Tax Havens of Europe, INT'L Bus., Aug. 1992, at 50. Compa-
nies are interested in moving money expeditiously without heavy taxation. Id. (quoting
Vice President of Intel Corporation, in charge of taxation issues). This is achieved by
interposing intermediate entities, located in the residence-country, between the ulti-
mate investor and their investment in the source-country. SeeJoseph C. Amico, Plan-
ning Under Article 26 of the 1992 U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty, 6 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1333,
1333-34 (1993) (providing example of this scenario).
35. See Ioannou, supra note 34, at 50 (discussing reduction in corporate income
taxes by placing corporate entity in Netherlands). The Netherlands has over 5,000 fi-
nance and holding company subsidiaries. Id.
36. See GORDON, supra note 16, at 152-57 (describing third-country residents' use
of foreign borrowing, finance companies, holding companies, active business, real es-
tate investment, and personal service companies).
37. See generaly Boudewijn Barre, The Use of a Dutch Intermediary Company to Help
Manage and Control an Organisation's Worldwide Tax Liabilities (June 5, 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with TAx NoTEs INT'L) (discussing position of Netherlands in
international tax planning).
38. See Morrison & Bennett, supra note 15, at 331 (describing Netherlands as sensi-
ble location for holding companies).
39. See Ioannou, supra note 34, at 50 (discussing other fiscal advantages of Nether-
lands).
40. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1992 244 (1992)
(describing Dutch economy as "highly developed and affluent"). Id.
41. See Ioannou, supra note 34, at 50 (discussing that Dutch are currently entered
into 50 tax treaties with other countries). The Dutch treaties afford favorable withhold-
ing tax rates on dividend, royalty, and interest payments to the Netherlands. TOMSETr,
supra note 33, at 34 (discussing potential reduction "on interest received by Dutch com-
pany to nil"). Selection of the Netherlands is cost effective for companies interested in
mergers or joint ventures. See Rolfe & Doupnik, supra note 6, at 327 (discussing forma-
tion of jointly-owned holding company between Clark Equipment and Volvo). The
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panies to predetermine their tax position and profits with cer-
tainty.42
2. Avoidance of U.S. Taxation Through Dutch
Holding Companies
Companies that were located in countries lacking a U.S.
double taxation avoidance treaty oftentimes invested in the
United States through a Dutch holding company.4" This com-
pany operated as a conduit through which passive income pay-
ments44 were transferred from a U.S. subsidiary, to a Dutch hold-
ing company, and then distributed to a third-country parent
company.45 Conventionally labeled the Dutch sandwich, the
Netherlands constituted the meat located in the middle of the
United States and the investing country.46
Under the 1948 Treaty, the passive income distributions
were subject to a reduced U.S. withholding tax rate. 47 Further-
Dutch tax treaty network facilitates transfers of capital among global operations at sig-
nificant tax savings. Id.
42. See TOMSETr, supra note 33, at 34 (stating that Dutch tax authorities regularly
give firm and binding rulings).
43. See GORDON, supra note 16, at 155 (discussing use of holding companies). A
holding company is defined as an entity that "usually confines its activities to owning
stock in, and supervising management of, other companies." BLAcis LAw DITrIONARY
731 (6th ed. 1990). A non-U.S. entity licensing a patent, for use in the United States,
could use a Dutch holding company for "back-to-back" royalties. GORDON, supra note
16, at 154. The non-U.S. entity avoided the 30% U.S. withholding tax, for royalties
received, by licensing its patent to a Dutch corporation, and then, licensing the patent
back to U.S. licensees. Id.; 1948 Treaty, supra note 15, art. 9, 62 Stat. at 1262, T.I.A.S.
No. 1855 at 7 (exempting payments of royalties from U.S. withholding tax). Canadian
corporations avoided withholding taxes on dividends by establishing an intermediary
company in the Netherlands. See Kingson, supra note 14, at 1276 (noting absence of
Dutch taxation on dividends paid out of profits not derived in Netherlands). Canadian
Pacific Limited used a Netherlands holding corporation for a U.S.$200,000,000 tender
offer. Id.
44. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i). Passive investment income, in part, includes re-
ceipts derived from royalties, rents, dividends, and interest. Id.
45. See GORDON, supra note 16, at 155.
46. Salil Tripathi, U.S.-Dutch Treaty Wipes Out Asian Firms' Tax Perks, Bus. TimES
(Singapore), July 6, 1992, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS File.
47. See 1948 Treaty, supra note 15, arts. 7, 9, 11, 12, 62 Stat. at 1761-62, T.I.A.S. No.
1855 at 6-8. If an investor controlled more than 25% of a subsidiary, the 30% U.S.
withholding tax was reduced to 5% for dividends received. Id. Furthermore, the tax
was reduced to nil for royalties and interest payments received. Id. Under the U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty, a lower 5% levy applies with holdings of more than 10%. U.S.-
Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 10, S. TrATY Doc. No. 6, at 20, 32 I.L.M. at 469. Dutch
intermediary companies will no longer be able to repatriate interest income and royal-
ties, generated in the United States, at a nominal tax cost. See Protocol Amending the
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more, Dutch domestic laws include a participation exemption48
which exempts a company's income from Dutch corporate in-
come tax when it is realized by a Dutch resident or non-resident
corporate taxpayer.49 Both the participation exemption and the
provisions, or lack thereof, of the 1948 Treaty presented third-
country nationals with a viable route to escape U.S. and Dutch
taxation.50
3. U.S. Dissatisfaction Escalates
The United States, since 1939, has actively sought to negoti-
ate tax conventions5' with trading partners to minimize the bur-
Convention between the United States of America and Kingdom of the Netherlands for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Oct. 13, 1993, S. TREAYa Doc. No. 19, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
[hereinafter Protocol] (applying 0% U.S. withholding rate on payments to third-country
residents, if payments are taxed at aggregate rate greater than or equal to 60% of regu-
lar Dutch company tax rate).
48. Maarten J. Ellis, Netherlands, in RECOURSE TO TAx HAVENS USE AND ABUSE 107,
112-13 (Kluwer Law & Taxation 1980) (discussing participation exemption found in
Article 13 of Corporate Income Tax Act of 1969). The participation exemption relieves
taxation for "dividends received from domestic and foreign corporate affiliates and cap-
ital gains from the sale of affiliate stock." See Philip H. Spector, Limitations on Benefits
Under the New U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, 47 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTA-
TION 159 (1993) (discussing attractiveness of Netherlands for holding companies).
Therefore, a company incorporated in the Netherlands is able to escape Dutch taxation
"if its sole activity is to act as a vehicle for receiving and distributing subsidiary earnings
and for the acquiring and disposing of subsidiary stock." Id.
49. See Stef van Weeghel, Netherlands Draft Bill Attempts Crackdown on Tax Haven
Transactions, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 422 (1993) (discussing proposed draft legislation in
Netherlands that would amend Corporate Income Tax Act of 1969); Maritte
Turkenburg &Jos Teeuwen, New Anti-Tax Haven Measures for the Netherlands, INT'L TAx
REv., Oct. 1993, at 23 (discussing revised subject-to-tax test for participation exemption
and describing proposed legislation as "radical"). Generally, income derived from the
source-country is exempt from Dutch income tax if certain requirements are met. See
van Weeghel, supra, at 424 n.9. One exception, under the 1948 Treaty, was that the
profit of the permanent establishment had to be subject to tax in another jurisdiction
before qualifying for liberation from the Dutch income tax. Id. at 424. However, this
provision's effectiveness was dubious because no minimum tax rate was stipulated. Id.
50. See GORDON, supra note 16, at 155 (noting that proper planning eliminated
'Dutch corporate tax).
51. See Rolfe & Doupnik, supra note 6, at 326. As of January 1, 1994, the United
States had treaties in force with the following countries: Australia, Austria, Barbados,
Belgium, Bermuda, Canada, People's Republic of China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, Tu-
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den of double taxation. 52 However, the compromise reached be-
tween the Contracting States is vitiated when tax avoidance prac-
tices assist unintended beneficiaries 53 and erode the U.S. tax
base.5" Treaty shoppers' use of U.S. tax conventions permits the
provisions of these bilateral agreements to supersede U.S. do-
mestic law.55 In addition, the U.S. ability to negotiate tax treaties
is frustrated when third-country investors attain commensurate
benefits through existing accords.56 Consequently, the value of
U.S. withholding taxes as a bargaining chip during tax treaty ne-
nisia, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. (former). Telephone interview with Office of In-
ternational Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Feb. 7, 1994).
52. Schreyer & Mitts, supra note 10, at 406. The United States enters into tax con-
ventions in order to reduce the taxation levied upon U.S. investors and to gain access to
relevant tax information. See id. (noting that tax treaties generally provide rules for
exchange of information to secure enforcement of each country's domestic revenue
laws); Bruce Zagaris, The U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty: Tax Collection Assistance and
Evidence-Gathering, 47 Buu... FOR INrr'L FiscAu. DOCUMENTATION 342 (1993) (discussing
collection assistance provisions in U.S.-Netherlands Treaty).
53. See Rolfe & Doupnik, supra note 6, at 325. The United States has manifested its
opposition to treaty shopping through court decisions and administrative rulings. Id. at
330-35. The holdings indicate the intention of the United States to deny treaty benefits
to intermediary entities with limited local ties to their country of residence by looking at
the substance, rather than the form, of a transaction. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United
States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (holding sham transaction); Moline Properties, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943) (finding sham corporation);Johansson v. United States,
336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964) (denying treaty benefits to U.S. boxer who, as Swedish
heavyweight boxing champion, attempted to take advantage of exemption clause in
U.S.-Swiss Treaty); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971) (holding
that Honduran corporation was not true recipient of interest, and therefore, not enti-
tled to treaty exemption). In 1984, the Internal Revenue Service (the "I.R.S.") issued
two revenue rulings, representing its most direct attack against treaty shopping. See
Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381 (denying 30% withholding tax on interest paid on
loan from Swiss corporation through its Netherlands Antilles subsidiary); Rev. Rul. 84-
153, 1984-2 C.B. 383 (holding that financing through Antilles was subject to 30% tax).
54. See Gild, supra note 1, at 581 (discussing lower revenues to Contracting States
due to treaty shopping); Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 812 (noting that source-country
has legitimate interest in ensuring that income accorded treaty benefits will be subject
to tax in residence-country); Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 25, at 396 (stating
that treaty shopping practices cause unintended revenue loss not envisioned by Con-
tracting States).
55. See Gild, supra note 1, at 582 (noting override of Internal Revenue Code be-
cause treaty shopping, contrary to intent of U.S. Congress, repeals U.S. taxes on income
repatriated to third-country that has not entered into tax convention with United
States).
56. See Schreyer & Mitts, supra note 10, at 406 (noting treaty shoppers' disinterest
in persuading their countries of residence to negotiate U.S. tax conventions); Gild,
supra note 1, at 581 (adding that this contradicts U.S. objective of concluding tax trea-
ties with its major trading partners).
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gotiations is minimized.57
B. The Evolution of the Limitation on Benefits Provision
The international efforts addressing the quandaries of inter-
national double taxation date back to the League of Nations.5 8
The United Nations and regional forums, most notably the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the
"OECD"),59 continue to examine these issues.6° The bodies,
comprising worldwide representation, document their efforts in
a series of model bilateral tax conventions.61 These treaties, cou-
pled with the U.S. and Dutch model treaties and the acumen
imparted through preceding U.S. bilateral treaties, facilitated
U.S.-Dutch negotiations regarding Article 26 of the U.S.-Nether-
lands Treaty.62
57. Schreyer & Mitts, supra note 10, at 406. The extensive U.S. tax treaty network
adversely affects U.S. citizens. See Gild, supra note 1, at 582-83 (alleging discrimination
against U.S. residents because they are unable to treaty shop).
58. U.N. MXuAL, supra note 16, at 16 (stating that "international efforts to deal
with the problems of international double taxation were begun by the League of Na-
tions .... ."). The "Report on Double Taxation," issued by the League of Nations in
1923, is the "intellectual base" from which modern treaties developed. See Honey L.
Goldberg, Conventions For the Elimination of International Double Taxation: Toward a Devel-
oping Country Model, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 833, 851-52 (1983).
59. See Jacques Sasseville, The OECD Model Tax Convention is Revised, 4 J. INrr'L
TAX'N 129 (1993) (noting that OECD was created after World War II to administer
Marshall Plan). The OECD establishes committees that cover numerous areas, includ-
ing financial markets, economic policy, and taxation. Id. In 1971, the OECD's Com-
mittee on Fiscal Affairs revised the extant Draft Double Taxation Convention on In-
come and on Capital, accounting for "the changes in systems of taxation and the in-
crease in international fiscal relations on the one hand and, on the other, the
development of new sectors of business activity and the increasingly complex forms of
organization adopted by enterprises for their international activities." Gild, supra note
1, at 565.
60. See generally Goldberg, supra note 58, at 835-39 (examining OECD and U.N.
models that serve as basis for many bilateral treaties currently in force).
61. See Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee, League of Nations
Doc. C.252 M.124 1935 IIA, at 4 (1935). The Fiscal Committee of the League of Na-
tions gave the following rationale for the elaboration of model tax conventions: "The
existence of model draft treaties.., has proved of real use... in helping to solve many
of the technical difficulties which arise in [the negotiation of tax treaties]." Id.; see Ro-
senbloom & Langbein, supra note 25, at 360 (stating that model treaties, produced
through international cooperation, are "major achievements").
62. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 3.
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1. The Inception of Anti-Treaty Shopping Language in U.S.
Tax Treaties
The earliest anti-treaty shopping language appeared in Arti-
cle 6 of the 1945 U.S.-U.K. Treaty.6 3 The arranged-or-main-
tained test, inaugurated in this tax convention, attempted to en-
sure that legitimate corporate structures were the sole benefi-
ciaries of lower dividend rates.64 The test, confined to several
words, had a narrow application due to its subjective focus and
its inadequate interpretive guidelines.65
The metamorphosis of the anti-treaty shopping language
into its own provision occurred in the 1962 U.S.-Luxembourg
Treaty.66 Article 15 of this tax accord explicitly proscribes grant-
ing treaty benefits to income entitled to special treatment under
Luxembourg laws.67 Third-country residents' infrequent use of
63. See U.S.-U.K Treaty, supra note 25.
64. Id. art. 6, 1 1, 60 Stat. at 1381, T.I.A.S. No. 1546 at 6 (stating that dividends
paid by corporation in source-country to controlling corporation in residence-country
were subject to 5% tax rate, rather than 30% U.S. withholding rate or 15% U.S.-U.K.
Treaty rate). The reduced rate was raised to 15% if "the relationship of the two corpo-
rations ha[d] been arranged or [was] maintained primarily with the intention of secur-
ing such reduced rate." Id. The arranged-or-maintained language appeared in several
subsequent U.S. income tax treaties. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with respect to Income, Oct. 25, 1956, U.S.-Aus., art. 6, 8 U.S.T. 1699, 1704,
T.I.A.S. No. 3923 at 6; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect
to Income, May 6, 1948, U.S.-Den., art. 6, 62 Stat. 1730, 1734, T.I.A.S. No. 1854 at 5;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Income, Sept. 13,
1949, U.S.-Ir., art. 6, 2 U.S.T. 2303, 2310, T.I.A.S. No. 2356 at 9; 1948 Treaty, supra note
15, art. 7, 62 Stat. 1757, 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 1855 at 6; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with respect to Income, May 24, 1951, U.S.-Switz., art. 6, 2 U.S.T. 1751,
1756-57, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 at 6.
65. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 780-81 (discussing absence of concrete gui-
dance for interpreting arranged-or-maintained test). The arranged-or-maintained test's
principal obstacle was enforceability because it concentrated on the subjective intent of
the individuals who had organized the corporate structure while offering tax authorities
virtually no guidance. Id.; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-300-91 (Apr. 28, 1982); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-
240-38 (Mar. 17, 1981). Moreover, this test failed to preclude arrangements to secure
the 15% rate. See Rev. Rul. 79-65, 1979-1 C.B. 458.
66. See Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962,
U.S.-Lux., 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726.
67. Id. art. 15, 15 U.S.T. at 2364, T.I.A.S. No. 5726 at 10. The nonreciprocal provi-
sion provides:
The present Convention shall not apply to the income of any holding
company entitled to any special tax benefit under Luxembourg Law ofJuly 31,
1929, and Decree Law of December 27, 1937, or under any similar law subse-
quently enacted, or to any income derived from such companies by any share-
holder thereof.
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Luxembourg, as an intermediary base for transferring invest-
ments into and out of the United States, reflects the effectiveness
of Article 15.68
2. Further Refinement
A 1970 U.S. tax convention with Finland (the "U.S.-Finland
Treaty") embodied an even more efficient and sophisticated
U.S. attempt to challenge third-country abuse of U.S. treaty ben-
efits.6 9 Article 27 of the U.S.-Finland Treaty, entitled "Invest-
ment or Holding Companies," enhanced the Luxembourg ap-
proach by denying benefits based on a special measures test and
a foreign ownership test.70 The special measures test provided
that treaty benefits would not be granted if the domestic laws
taxed income at lower rates than business profits generally.71
The foreign ownership test similarly denied benefits where non-
68. Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 781 (stating that simple rule of U.S.-Luxembourg
Treaty accomplished purpose).
69. Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Mar. 6, 1970, U.S.-
Fin., 22 U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042 [hereinafter 1970 U.S.-Finland Treaty].
70. 1970 U.S.-Finland Treaty, supra note 69, art. 27, 22 U.S.T. at 72-73, T.I.A.S. No.
7042 at 32-33. Article 27 states:
A corporation of one of the Contracting States deriving dividends, inter-
est, or royalties from sources within the other Contracting State shall not be
entitled to the benefits...
(a) by reason of special measures granting tax benefits to investment
or holding companies the tax imposed on such corporation by
the former Contracting State with respect to such dividends, in-
terest, or royalties is substantially less than the tax generally im-
posed by such Contracting State on corporate profits, and
(b) 25 percent or more of the capital of such corporation is held of
record or is otherwise determined, after consultation between
the competent authorities of the Contracting States, to be owned
directly or indirectly, by one or more persons who are not indi-
vidual residents of the former Contracting State (or, in the case
of a Finnish corporation, who are citizens of the United States).
Id. This provision only applied to corporations with respect to dividends, interest, and
royalty payments. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 786 (discussing narrowness of this
provision). Similar provisions appeared in several U.S. treaties ratified in the 1970's.
See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, May 7, 1975, U.S.-Ice., art. 27, 26
U.S.T. 2004, 2100, T.I.A.S. No. 8151 at 98 (adding capital gains to list of income items
possibly denied and omitting reference to investment or holding companies in text);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., art. 16, 31
U.S.T. 5668, 5683, T.I.A.S. No. 9682 at 16 (departing from basic two-part test espoused
in U.S.-Finland Treaty).
71. See supra note 70 (delineating special measures test in paragraph (a)).
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residents owned a substantial percentage of the interests in an
entity.72 This two-part rule, incorporated into most bilateral
treaties negotiated in the 1970's, had a significant impact on the
drafting of the first U.S. Model Treaty.
73
In 1977, the United States promulgated a Model Treaty (the
"1977 Model") to function as a coherent guide for future treaty
negotiations." Article 16 of the 1977 Model contained a stream-
lined "Investment or Holding Companies" provision,75 which
mirrored the two-part rule in the U.S.-Finland Treaty.76 Article
16, though ineffective, 77 highlighted flaws in the practical appli-
cation of these tests and facilitated the progression towards a
more stringent provision. 78
The next revision, in December of 1981, significantly al-
tered the previous requirements. 79 The 1981 U.S. Model Treaty
72. Id. (denying benefits of U.S.-Finland Treaty if third-country residents con-
trolled 25% or more of company's capital).
73. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 785 (proclaiming U.S.-Finland Treaty as "pro-
totype").
74. See 1977 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 28, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 208, at
10,539.
75. Id. art. 16, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 208, at 10,546. The provision provides that
If 25% or more of the capital of a company which is a resident of a Con-
tracting State is owned directly or indirectly by individuals who are not resi-
dents of that State, and if by reason of special measures the tax imposed by
that State on that company with respect to dividends, interest or royalties aris-
ing in the other Contracting State is substantially less than the tax generally
imposed by the first-mentioned State on corporate business profits, then...
that other State may tax such dividends, interest or royalties.
Id.
76. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 793 (analyzing 1977 U.S. Model Treaty).
77. Doernberg, supra note 12, at 189. The narrowness of Article 16 of the 1977
U.S. Model Treaty raised few objections among U.S. trading partners. Id. The limited
application of this provision has been attributed to "the fact that corporate ownership
was based solely on ownership of a corporation's stock, that only corporations would
lose treaty benefits, and that the only treaty benefits that would be lost were those per-
taining to dividends, interest, or royalties." Id.; see Freud, supra note 32, at 635 (discuss-
ing ability of entities, not treated as corporate bodies for tax purposes, to be used as
source converters, thereby avoiding burden of both primary and secondary withholding
tax). In addition, there was no guidance for the administration of this provision. Ro-
senbloom, supra note 4, at 793. Furthermore, the drafters of the 1977 U.S. Model failed
to address nonspecial rules that might result in extremely low taxation in the country of
corporate residence. Id.; see Doernberg, supra note 12, at 189 (discussing low corporate
tax rate as example of nonspecial rule).
78. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 794-95 (labeling 1980 proposed tax conven-
tion between United States and Cyprus as "first attempt to limit treaty benefits generally
with respect to taxpayers other than corporations").
79. See 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 8, art. 16, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 211,
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extended coverage to all taxpayers and for all treaty benefits.80
Entities were required to meet both the foreign ownership stan-
dard and a revised special measures test.8" A safe harbor was
added to the foreign ownership rule by presuming resident own-
ership if a company's stock was traded on an approved stock ex-
change. 2
The revised special measures test," otherwise labeled a con-
duit rule, 4 was more effective than its predecessor, which ena-
bled non-residents to escape taxation by comparing two tax ba-
ses that could both be depleted. 5 In contrast, the 1981 U.S.
Model test examined the substantiality of payments made to
at 10,580. Article 16 of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, entitled "Limitation on Benefits,"
states:
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Con-
tracting State shall not be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxa-
tion in the other Contracting State unless
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is
owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more individual residents of the
first-mentioned Contracting State; and
(b) the income of such person is not used in substantial part, di-
rectly or indirectly, to meet liabilities (including liabilities for interest or
royalties) to persons who are residents of a State other than a Contracting
State and who are not citizens of the United States.
For the purposes of subparagraph (a), a company that has substantial trading
in its stock on a recognized exchange in a Contracting State is presumed to be
owned by individual residents of that Contracting State.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if it is determined that the acquisition or
maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as
a principal purpose obtaining benefits under the Convention.
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident of the
other Contracting State under the Convention shall be inapplicable to the
extent that, under the law in force in that other State, the income to which the
relief relates bears significantly lower tax than similar income arising within
that other State derived by residents of that other State.
Id.
80. Id. (expanding scope of provision to cover all benefits). But see supra note 75
(limiting reach of 1977 U.S. Model provision to only passive income items).
81. See supra note 79 (noting placement of "and" between paragraphs 1 (a) and
1 (b) of 1981 U.S. Model Treaty).
82. Id. (focusing on sentence following paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b)).
83. Id. (omitting term "special measures" from text of provision).
84. See Schreyer & Mitts, supra note 10, at 272 (describing conduit rule as base
erosion provision).
85. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 798 (stating that purpose of revised special
measures test was to fill "perceived deficiency" of previous rule). The prior test permit-
ted third-country residents to avoid taxation when the laws of the residence-country and
the third-country both sufficiently depleted the tax base. Id.
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non-treaty residents, thereby mitigating a notable defect.86 In
addition, a potential defense was afforded to those taxpayers
who could demonstrate that the principal purpose of their oper-
ations was not the procurement of treaty benefits.87 Despite
these improvements, the continued dependence on presumptive
tests, with limited interpretive guidelines, frustrated the adop-
tion of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty as a comprehensive anti-
treaty shopping provision. 88
3. International Efforts: OECD Model Tax Treaties
In 1956, the OECD assembled a Fiscal Committee to ex-
amine a potential uniform multilateral treaty for the avoidance
of double taxation.8 9 The international taxing principles em-
braced in subsequent OECD model conventions influenced the
negotiations of several hundred bilateral income tax treaties
signed throughout the world.90 The adoption of the 1992
OECD Model Treaty91 replaced the existing 1977 version.92
Although the 1992 version does not contain a limitation on ben-
efits provision, U.S. persistence 93 in this area necessitated a
lengthy discussion of its merits in the 1992 Commentary at-
tached to the 1992 Model. 94 The 1992 Commentary dismissed
earlier attempts to limit treaty shopping95 and endorsed recent
U.S. treaty and statutory developments.96
86. Id. (discussing advantage of analyzing substantiality of payments rather than
comparing tax bases).
87. See supra note 79 (stating test in paragraph 2 for bypass of paragraph 1).
88. See Freud, supra note 32, at 636-37 (noting that equivocal definitions of "sub-
stantially" and "substantial use" and unclear policy of U.S. government inhibited effec-
tiveness of 1981 U.S. Model Treaty).
89. See supra note 59 (discussing function of OECD); Rosenbloom & Langbein,
supra note 25, at 367-68 (providing history of OECD efforts).
90. See Richard E. Andersen, New OECD Model Expands Scope, Conduit, Limitation-on-
Benefits Principles, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 46, 46 (1993) (discussing unparalleled influence of
1977 OECD Treaty).
91. See 1992 OECD Model, supra note 28, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 191, at 10,503.
For further discussion of the 1992 OECD Model Treaty, see Sasseville, supra note 59.
92. See Andersen, supra note 90, at 46 (discussing changes in 1992 OECD Model).
93. U.S. adamancy is not shared by all OECD delegations. Id. at 48. Opponents
contend that most offensive treaty abuse situations can be neutralized by existing princi-
ples of faus legis, substance-over-form, and beneficial ownership. Id. Furthermore, less
egregious treaty abuse situations are not worth serious concern. Id.
94. Id. at 47-48.
95. See id. at 47 (describing prior methods as unsatisfactory).
96. See id. at 47-48 (recognizing significant U.S. impact on OECD's view of treaty
shopping).
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C. Unilateral Override: Alternative to Bilateral Tax Treaties
In the United States, a conflict exists between the power of
the U.S. Congress to override treaty obligations through unilat-
eral legislation and the obligation of the U.S. government to ad-
here to negotiated agreements with its trade partners.97 The
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution98 to
mean that equivalent weight should be given to the legal author-
ity of tax treaties and federal statutes.99 If a conflict arises be-
tween a statute and a treaty provision, accepted cannons of con-
struction defer to the one passed most recently.10 The willing-
ness of the U.S. Congress to resolve the treaty shopping
predicament through unilateral legislation influenced the Dutch
government's decision to engage in meaningful negotiations
with the United States. 10 1
1. Congress Adopts a "Qualified Resident" Requirement
The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "TRA '86")102
97. See Belotsky, supra note 6, at 64-65 (surveying treaty process in United States).
Senator Robert Dole voiced concern with this inherent conflict when he commented
that "as the United States tax treaty network grows and as tax treaties become more
detailed and complex, this concern regarding the possible conflicts between the tax
legislative process and the tax treaty process can only increase." Dole Comments on Pend-
ing Tax Treaties, 13 TAX NOTES 1005 (1981).
98. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that the
"[I]aws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... " Id.
99. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194-95 (1888). Section 7852(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code states: "For pur-
poses of determining the relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the
United States affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential
status by reason of its being a treaty or law." I.R.C. § 7852(d) (1).
100. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (holding "the one last in date will control the other
."); Belotsky, supra note 6, at 65.
101. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51 (discussing lack of discernible
progress in negotiations before passage of U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986).
102. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). TRA '86
embodied one of the "most comprehensive revisions of the Federal income tax system
.... STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, GEN. EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF
1986, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1987) [hereinafter EXPLANATION]. Furthermore,
Congress concluded that only a thorough reform could assure a fairer, more
efficient, and simpler tax system. Congress believed that the Act, establishing
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, will restore the trust of the American
people in the income tax system and lead the nation's economy into greater
productivity.
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demonstrated Congress' initiative to override those bilateral
treaties that engendered abusive treaty violations.' TRA '86
instituted section 884 of the Internal Revenue Code
(the "I.R.C."),,' an innovative branch profits tax, in an attempt
to equalize the tax treatment of domestic subsidiaries
and branches of non-U.S. corporations.10 Section 884(e) of
the I.R.C. seeks to curb treaty shopping by explicitly con-
fining treaty benefits to qualified residents °6 of U.S. treaty
partners. 10 7 In addition, the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury De-
103. See Doernberg, supra note 12, at 173 (citing pressure placed on U.S. Congress
to control unwieldy budget deficit as principal reason for enactment of TRA '86). Con-
gress "intended the Act to override conflicting provisions in U.S. treaties." EXPLANA-
TION, supra note 102, at 1038.
104. See I.R.C. § 884. The branch profits tax applies a 30% rate, notwithstanding
any prohibition or limitation in a U.S. tax treaty. I.R.C. § 884(a).
105. See GUSTAFSON & PUGH, supra note 1, at 142-44 (discussing branch profits
tax); Doernberg, supra note 12, at 173 (noting pressure on U.S. Congress to increase
government revenues). The branch profits tax is "applied to a base intended to be
equivalent to the amount which could have been distributed as a dividend by a hypo-
thetical U.S. subsidiary of the foreign corporation whose only income, assets and liabili-
ties are those of the U.S. business of the foreign corporation . . . ." Fred Feingold &
David M. Rozen, New Regime of Branch Level Taxation Now Imposed on Certain Foreign Corpo-
rations, 66 J. TAX'N 2, 2 (1987); see I.R.C. § 884(e)(3) (taxing "dividend equivalent
amount"). For further discussion of the branch profits tax, see Peter H. Blessing, The
Branch Tax, 40 TAX LAw. 587 (1987). The objective of the branch profits tax was analo-
gous to the 30% tax on dividend distributions from domestic corporations to non-resi-
dent investors. Doernberg, supra note 12, at 178-79. See I.R.C. §§ 861 (a) (2) (A), 871 (a).
106. See I.R.C. § 884(e) (1) (stating that "[n]o treaty between the United States and
a foreign country shall exempt any foreign corporation from the tax imposed ... un-
less- (A) such treaty is an income tax treaty, and (B) such foreign corporation is a
qualified resident of such foreign country"). Section 884 of the I.R.C. establishes
whether a corporation is a qualified resident. I.R.C. § 884(e) (4). The tests include:
1. 50% foreign ownership test or 50% percent base erosion (conduit) test.
I.R.C. § 884 (e)(4)(A); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.884-5(a)(1), (b)(1), (c).
2. Stock of company, or stock of parent company, is primarily and regularly
traded on an established securities market. I.R.C. § 884 (e) (4) (B), (C); see also
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.884-5(a) (2), (d)(1).
3. Non-U.S. corporation is engaged in active conduct of business in residence-
country, has a substantial presence in residence-country, and notwithstanding
the exception for interest received, the U.S. business is an integral part of an
active business conducted in the residence-country. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.884-
5(a) (3), (e).
4. Ruling by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury that the corporation is a quali-
fied resident. I.R.C. § 884(e) (4) (D); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.884-5(a) (4), (f).
The first test requires that a taxpayer meet either the foreign ownership or the base
erosion test. I.R.C. § 884(e) (4) (A) (i), (ii). But see supra notes 79, 81 and accompanying
text (requiring that both tests be satisfied under 1981 U.S. Model Treaty).
107. I.R.C. § 884(e)(1)(A); see Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, IRS Uses Ex-
panded Conduit Principle to Limit Treaty Shopping, 76J. TAX'N 170, 171 (1992) (discussing
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partment is empowered, under appropriate circumstances, to ex-
empt third-country corporations from the residency qualifica-
tions.1" 8 Section 884(e) of the I.R.C. and the correlative Treas-
ury Regulations, in contrast to the sparse explanatory language
offered in preceding treaties, 10 9 enhanced the utility of the anti-
treaty shopping provision and served as the framework for future
U.S. bilateral tax conventions. °10 ,
Despite this affirmation, section 884 potentially violates U.S.
tax treaties111 because non-U.S. corporations, unlike their U.S.
counterparts, are subject to a branch profits tax on their earn-
ings.' U.S. tax conventions purposely include non-discrimina-
tion clauses' 1 3 to ensure that the United States does not tax enti-
that anti-treaty shopping provision of section 884 prevents treaty shopping by third-
country corporations directly engaged in U.S. business, but not investors engaged in
U.S. business through U.S. subsidiary).
108. I.R.C. § 884(e) (4) (D). Eight factors that the Commissioner of the I.R.S. may
take into consideration when determining whether a non-U.S. corporation is a quali-
fied resident are: (1) Business reasons for establishing and maintaining corporation;
(2) Date of incorporation compared to date that applicable U.S. bilateral treaty was
entered; (3) Continuity of the historical business and ownership; (4) Extent to which
the corporation satisfies one or more of the tests of section 884; (5) Extent to which
U.S. trade or business is dependent on capital, assets, or personnel of the company; (6)
Whether the company is a recipient of special tax benefits in the residence-country; (7)
Whether the corporation is a member of an affiliated group; and (8) Extent to which
the corporation would be entitled to comparable treaty benefits with respect to income
tax treaty that would apply to that corporation if it had been incorporated in the coun-
try or countries of residence of the majority of its shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-
5(f) (2) (i)-(viii).
109. See supra notes 77, 88 and accompanying text (attributing ineffectiveness, in
part, to limited guidelines).
110. See Morrison & Bennett, supra note 15, at 332 (discussing substantial impact
on U.S. bilateral tax accords).
111. See supra note 106 (discussing override of U.S. treaties unless corporation is
qualified resident).
112. See Doernberg, supra note 12, at 180 (discussing Congress' intent to substitute
branch tax for second-level withholding tax imposed on non-U.S. shareholders of U.S.
corporations). Congress' purpose was to equalize the tax treatment of a non-U.S. cor-
poration directly conducting a U.S. trade or business with the treatment of a U.S. sub-
sidiary conducting such trade or business. Id. The U.S. Congress presumed that "a
branch profits tax does not unfairly discriminate against foreign corporations because it
treats foreign corporations and their shareholders together no worse than U.S. corpora-
tions and their shareholders . . . ." EXPLANATION, supra note 102, at 1038.
113. See, e.g., 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 8, art. 24, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH)
211, at 10,582. Article 24 of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, entitled "Non-Discrimination,"
provides:
Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Con-
tracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which
is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements
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ties from other countries more severely than its own nationals." 4
Congress acknowledged the incongruity between section 884
and U.S. treaties, declining to abrogate existing tax treaties out-
right."5 Furthermore, the I.R.C. was amended in 1988 to recog-
nize the IRS' inclination towards honoring international tax
agreements." 6  Notwithstanding this recognition, the annul-
ment of existing bilateral conventions, though permissible
under U.S. domestic law," 7 constitutes an infraction of interna-
tional law under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties." 8
to which nationals of that other State in the same circumstances are or may be
subjected.
Id.
114. See Doernberg, supra note 12, at 179-81 (discussing relationship between non-
discrimination clauses and branch profits tax). In addition to tax treaties, non-discrimi-
nation clauses are contained in Friendship, Commerce and Navigation ("FCN") trea-
ties. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, U.S.-
Neth., 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942. See Doernberg, supra note 12, at 199-200 (dis-
cussing unilateral override of all existing U.S. FCN treaties).
115. EXPLANATION, supra note 102, at 1038. Congress' hesitation was manifest
when it declared that it "generally did not intend to override U.S. income tax treaty
obligations that arguably prohibit imposition of the branch profits tax .... Congress
adopted this position, however, only on the understanding that the Treasury Depart-
ment will renegotiate outstanding treaties that prohibit imposition of the tax." Id. Con-
gress' position was prudent. Doernberg, supra note 12, at 180-81 (discussing unsubstan-
tiated assumption by Congress that branch profits tax and secondary tax on dividend
distributions to U.S. investors are equivalents).
116. See I.R.C. § 894. This section states that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be
applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United States
which applies to such taxpayer." Id.
117. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that weight is given to
more recent provision).
118. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 690 (1980) (stating that "[a] party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty"). The United States, though not officially a party to the Vienna Convention,
recognizes that this pact codifies international law binding on the United States. See,
e.g., Congressional Research Service, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Pr. No. 98-205, Treaties and
Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate 41 (1984) (explaining
that Vienna Convention "retains its status as a primary source of international law con-
cerning treaties, even for nonparties"). The U.S. obligation to international law is em-
braced in other sources. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(b) (1986) (stating "[t]hat a rule of international
law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law does not
relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a
violation of that obligation"). The duty of the United States to honor its treaties is
embraced in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda ("agreements of the parties must be
observed"). Doernberg, supra note 12, at 202 n.193.
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2. The Rostenkowski Bill: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Revise
TRA '86
On May 28, 1992, Congressmen Rostenkowski [D-IL] and
Gradison [R-OH] introduced House Bill 5270 (the "Rostenkow-
ski Bill") to the Committee on Ways and Means to amend TRA
'86.119 The Rostenkowski Bill proposed to curtail treaty abuse by
repudiating treaty benefits granted to third-country residents
subject to significantly lower taxes. 120 House Bill 5270 imposed a
narrow qualified resident requirement that did not include an
active business test.121  Though eventually vetoed, the Ros-
tenkowski Bill illustrates a plausible approach by the U.S. Con-
gress that would reduce incidents of treaty shopping by abrogat-
ing U.S. tax treaties in force. 122
D. U.S.-German Limitation on Benefits Provision: Precursor to the
U.S.-Dutch Negotiations
The 1990 U.S.-Federal Republic of Germany Treaty (the
"U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty"), 123 based predominately on the 1981 U.S.
119. H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302, at 70 (1992).
120. Section 302(c) (2) provides:
Tax Favored Income -
No person shall be entitled to any benefits granted by the United States under
any treaty between the United States and a foreign country with respect to any
income of such person if such income bears a significantly lower tax under the
laws of such foreign country than similar income arising from sources within
such foreign country derived by residents of such foreign country.
Id. § 302(c) (2), at 71. This provision is similar to the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty. See supra
note 79 (noticing similarity between paragraph 3 of 1981 Model Treaty and section
302(c) (2) of Rostenkowski Bill).
121. H.R. 5270, supra note 119, § 302(c) (1), at 70-71; see supra note 106 (discuss-
ing qualified resident requirement of section 884 of I.R.C. that includes active business
test). The non-U.S. entity must satisfy either a 50% ownership test or a 50% base ero-
sion test. H.R. 5270, supra note 119, § 302(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii), at 71-72. Special rules
apply to publicly traded entities. Id. § 302(c)(3)(B), at 72. In addition, the Secretary
may treat a non-U.S. entity as a qualified resident if it is "in a manner consistent with
the purposes" of the section. Id. § 302(c) (3) (D), at 73.
122. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing infraction of Vienna
Treaty); Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 68 (describing Rostenkowski Bill as
roughly hewn legislative proposal).
123. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fis-
cal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes,
Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., S. TRaEAY Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted
in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3249, at 28,151 [hereinafter U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty]. The U.S.-
F.R.G. Treaty replaced the 1954 accord. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double
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Model 124 and the OECD Model, 125 was envisioned as the arche-
type for future negotiations.2 6 The qualified residence rules de-
tailed in the U.S. branch profits tax127 noticeably influenced the
limitation on benefits provision contained in Article 28 of the
U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty.' 2 This provision controls the issuance of tax
benefits to the intended recipients and prevents the extension to
non-residents who cannot establish a substantial business in, or
business nexus with, the intermediary treaty partner. 2 9
The first of the four paragraphs of Article 28 states alterna-
tive residency criterion, any one of which entitles conferment of
benefits in the source-country. 130 This provision articulates that
an entity, other than a party who automatically qualifies,13 ' is not
entitled to the benefits of the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty unless that en-
tity satisfies either an active business test, 132 a coextensive foreign
Taxation with respect to Income, July 22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., 5 U.S.T. 2768, T.I.A.S. No.
3133.
124. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (discussing 1981 U.S. Model
Treaty).
125. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (discussing OECD Model
Treaty).
126. See Richard E. Andersen, U.S. and West Germany Sign New Ground-Breaking Tax
Treaty, 1J. INT'L TAX'N 60, 60 (1990) (discussing provisions of U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty). Arti-
cle 28 "rides the 'new wave' of U.S. limitation-on-benefits treaty articles .... ." Id. at 62.
But see Stephan Eilers & Maureen W. Brfigmann, Article 28 of the German-US Double Taxa-
tion Treaty of 1989: An Appropriate Solution to the Treaty Shopping Problem?, TAx PLANNING
INT'L REv., Sept. 1993, at 15, 20 (concluding that "Article 28 creates more problems
rather than providing a convincing solution to the treaty shopping problem").
127. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text (discussing rules under TRA
'86).
128. See U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 123, art. 28, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 73-75,
2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3249.57, at 28,166.
129. Id.
130. See id. art. 28, 1, S. TrATv Doc. No. 10, at 73-74, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
3249.57, at 28,166 (containing six subparagraphs that provide tests to determine resi-
dency).
131. See id. art. 28, 1(a), (b), S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 73, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
3249.57, at 28,166 (exempting individual, contracting nation, or political subdivision
or local authority thereof from residency requirements).
132. Id. art. 28, 1(c), S. TRATY Doc. No. 10, at 73, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
3249.57, at 28,166. A company satisfies the active business test if "engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business in the first-mentioned Contracting State . . . and the
income derived from the other Contracting State is derived in connection with, or is
incidental to, that trade or business." Id. This subjective test can be traced back to the
1981 U.S. Model which denied treaty benefits if the entity was primarily interested in
their procurement. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing rule that
broadly examined principal purpose of entity's operations). In contrast, the U.S.-F.R.G.
Treaty contains a more precise test. See U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 123, art. 28,
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ownership and base erosion test, 133 or a public company test.13 4
Unlike the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty'35 and the U.S.-Finland
Treaty, 3 6 a company that fails to meet any of the aforemen-
tioned requirements can still seek recourse via a competent au-
thority of the State in which the income in question arises.'
3 7
1(c), S. TREAgTY Doc. No. 10, at 73, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249.57, at 28,166. How-
ever, any practical disparity between the 1981 U.S. Model and U.S.-F.R.G. tests would
likely depend on their interpretation and application by courts and the tax authorities.
Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3256,
at 28,248 (July 27, 1990) [hereinafter U.S.-F.RG. Report] (noting significant impact of
either lenient or strict interpretation of tests).
133. U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 123, art. 28, 1 1(e), S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at
73-74, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249.57, at 28,166. The foreign ownership test and base
erosion test provide:
e) aa) a person, more than 50 percent of the beneficial interest in which (or
in the case of a company, more than 50 percent of the number of
shares of each class of whose shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by
persons entitled to benefits of this Convention under subparagraphs
(a), (b), (d), or (f) or who are citizens of the United States; and
bb) a person, more than 50 percent of the gross income of which is not
used, directly or indirectly, to meet liabilities (including liabilities for
interest or royalties) to persons not entitled to benefits of this Conven-
tion under subparagraphs (a), (b), (d), or (f) or who are not citizens
of the United States ...
Id. This section is similar to the 1981 U.S. Model test, however more closely resembles
section 884 of the I.R.C. by lowering the qualifying percentage in paragraph 1 (e) (aa)
from 75% to 50%. See supra note 79 (stating U.S. Model test); supra note 106 (present-
ing rules of branch profits tax).
134. U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 123, art. 28, 1(d), 3(a)-(c), S. TRTx Doc.
No. 10, at 73-74, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3249.57, at 28,166. This test states:
1. A person... shall be entitled... to all the benefits .. , if such person is:
d) a company in whose principal class of shares there is substantial and regu-
lar trading on a recognized stock exchange;
3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the term "recognized stock exchange"
means:
a) the NASDAQ System owned by the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. and any stock exchange registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as a national securities exchange for purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934;
b) any German Stock exchange on which registered dealings in shares take
place;
c) any other stock exchange agreed upon by the competent authorities of the
Contracting States.
Id.
135. See supra note 79 (lacking discretionary rule empowering competent authority
in 1981 U.S. Model Treaty).
136. See supra note 70 (lacking discretionary rule in U.S.-Finland Treaty).
137. See U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 123, art. 28, 1 2, S. TRArTY Doc. No. 10, at
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Though a considerable advancement in the limitation on
benefits provision, the enactment of Article 28 ignited a contro-
versy over whether the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty conflicts with the
Treaty of Rome. 3 ' An action for breach of the Treaty of Rome
may exist because U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty benefits are denied to Euro-
pean Community ("EC") members on the basis of their national-
ity.1 39  The U.S.-F.R.G. Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU") and the U.S. Senate Report on the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty
attempted to mitigate German concerns over conflicts involving
a potential breach of the Treaty of Rome 140 and an eventual
74, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249.57, at 28,166; supra note 108 and accompanying text
(discussing discretionary power of Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department under
section 884 of I.R.C.).
138. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), art. 67, 1, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 42 (1958) [hereinafter
EECTreaty]. On February 7, 1992, the twelve member states of the European Commu-
nity signed the Treaty on European Union, in Maastricht, The Netherlands. See Treaty
on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247
(1992) (amending EEC Treaty). The member states of the European Community in-
clude: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 725, 31 I.L.M. at 253.
The proclivity of Western European nations to harmonize their economic, social, and
political activities has increased under the aegis of the European Community. See
George B. Hefferan, III & Joanne Katsantonis, Movement Towards an Internal Market in
1993: An Overview of Current Legal Devekpments in the European Community, 3 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1992) (describing Treaty on European Union as new stage in Euro-
pean integration).
139. See EEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 67, 1 1, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42. Article 67 of
the EEC Treaty states:
Member States shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively
abolish as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belong-
ing to persons resident in Member States and also any discriminatory treat-
ment based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on
the place in which such capital is invested.
Id.; see Federation of Netherlands Industry (VNO')/Baker & McKenzie Seminar, in THE 1992
UNITED STATES-NETHERLANDS TAx CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 92, 108 [hereinafter
Seminar] (discussing possible breach); Reinhard P61lath, Investing in Germany Under the
New U.S.-German Tax Treaty, 2J. INT'L TAX'N 175, 176 (1991) (presenting potential sce-
nario of German company, with majority of non-German shareholders resident in other
EC countries, not obtaining benefits under U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty). A citizen of a EC mem-
ber state may initiate an action for breach either in the German courts or by asking the
European Commission to commence an infringement procedure under Article 169 of
the Treaty of Rome. See EEC Treaty, supra note 138, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75 (stat-
ing that "[i]f the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil any of its
obligations under this Treaty, it shall give a reasoned opinion on the matter . . .");
Seminar, supra, at 108 (discussing French company's filing of complaint with European
Commission).
140. See Understanding Regarding the Scope of the Limitation on Benefits Article
1994] THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS INCOME TAX TREATY 801
override by U.S. legislation.14 1
The U.S.-F.R.G. framework was instrumental in the ensuing
U.S.-Dutch negotiations. 4 2 The U.S.-Dutch delegations readily
adopted Article 28 of the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, 43 liberalizing and
augmenting its requirements, in order to revamp the 1948
Treaty.' 44 Ultimately, the limitation on benefits provision in the
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty mollified both the Dutch concern that
their businesses qualify under the determinable rules and the
U.S. resolve to thwart treaty shopping.1 45
I. THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS LIMITATION ON
BENEFITS PROVISION
The United States and the Netherlands successfully miti-
gated the concerns of their two divergent tax policies,1 46 signing
in the Convention Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of
America, S. TisTxry Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-F.R.G.
Understanding]. The U.S.-F.R.G. MOU specifically provides that "[t]he discretionary
authority granted to the competent authorities ... should be exercised with particular
cognizance of, the developments in, and objectives of, international economic integra-
tion, such as that between the member countries of the European Communities and
between the United States and Canada." Id. at 9.
141. US.-F.RG. Report, supra note 132, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3256, at 28,296-97.
The Senate Report on the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty states that "[i]t appears that any corpora-
tion that would satisfy the limitation on benefits article of the proposed treaty would
generally also meet the definition of 'qualified resident' for branch profits tax purposes
in the Code." Id.
142. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51 (describing prior negotiations as
"desultory and fitful"). The limited progress in treaty negotiations was attributed by
some to a belief that the Netherlands itself derived a benefit from third-country resi-
dents' use of the 1948 Treaty. U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at 18. The U.S.-Dutch
talks intensified after Germany agreed to a comprehensive anti-treaty shopping provi-
sion with the United States. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 50-51.
143. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 52 (noting overall structure of U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty "mirrors" U.S.-F.R.G. provision). But see Eilers & Brfigmann, supra
note 126, at 20 (stating that Article 28 of U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty "should neither serve as a
model for fashioning a Community standard nor as a model for German treaty policy).
144. Joseph DeCarlo, Jr., et. al., An Overview of the Limitation on Benefits Article of the
New Netherlands-US. Income Tax Convention, 22 TAx MGrr. INT'LJ. 271, 271 (1993). Due
to the variances between the economies of the Netherlands and Germany, the more
"rigorous" German provision would have been unacceptable to the Dutch government.
Id.; see Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51 (discussing need to further liberalize
and affix immense quantity of additional detail to tests in U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty).
145. See DeCarlo, supra note 144, at 271.
146. See Paul H. Sleurink & Richard E. Andersen, U.S.-Dutch Treaty Reflects Changed
Policies and Economic Forces, 4 J. ITrr'L TAx'N 104, 104 (1993) (discussing compromise
between two opposing views). The Netherlands extends benefits of a tax treaty to any-
one who meets the basic residency test. See id. (granting treaty benefits to resident
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what has been labeled "the single most important step required
to improve the U.S. treaty network."147 Article 26 of the U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty,14 8 unlike prior U.S. tax conventions, ex-
tends treaty benefits to third-country residents. 49 The length 150
and complexity 51 of Article 26152 supersedes the detail incorpo-
unless proven that entity is not entitled to such benefits). The narrower U.S. standard
mandates a sufficient nexus. See id. (requiring demonstration that entity is qualified
resident to obtain benefits). The theory of taxation, in the Netherlands, is based on the
capital import neutrality principle, whereas the U.S. view is based on the capital export
neutrality precept. See de Hosson, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing other discrepancies,
such as country size, transfer pricing methods, and balance between treaties and domes-
tic law); Frank van Brunschot & Stef van Weeghel, Netherlands-United States: The New Tax
Convention, 33 EUR. TAX'N 191, 202 (1993) (discussing "open and very much interna-
tionally oriented economy" of Netherlands).
147. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 3. For further discussion of the limita-
tion on benefits provision in the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, see Goossen, supra note 30;
Philip T. Kaplan, Treaty Shopping Under the New U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, 47 BULL. FOR
INTr'L FiscAL DOCUMENTATION 175 (1993); Spector, supra note 48.
148. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, S. TirATY Doc. No. 6, at 59, 32
I.L.M. at 486. The Convention includes a Protocol, signed on October 13, 1993. See
Protocol, supra note 47, S. TETYrv Doc. No. 19; Maarten de Bruin, New Protocol to US.-
Dutch Treaty Tries to Allay U.S. Concerns, 4J. INT'L TAX'N 517 (1993). In addition, the
Convention contains Agreed Minutes, signed by the two delegations on September 11,
1993. See Paul H. Sleurink, Making Sense of the U.S.-Dutch Double Taxation Treaty, 12 INT'L
FIN. L. REv. 23 (1993) (noting that Agreed Minutes comprise common and binding
understanding of interpretation and application of Convention). The addition of a
protocol was mandated if the Netherlands failed to revise certain provisions of Dutch
law within a specified time. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 24, 1 4, S. TRTrv
Doc. No. 6, at 51, 32 I.L.M. at 483; see John Turro, U.S. and Dutch Negotiators Settle
'Triangular Problem' in Protocol, 7 TAX NoTEs INT'L 775, 776 (1993) (discussing imposi-
tion of 15% withholding tax on interest and royalty payments that fail to meet aggre-
gate, Dutch and third-country, tax rate of 60%).
149. See van Brunschot & van Weeghel, supra note 146, at 206 (discussing grant of
derivative benefits to residents of EC nations).
150. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51. The Convention totals 100 pages of
typescript and Article 26 consumes 23 pages of that text. Id. In addition, the Conven-
tion contains 19 more pages of explanation in the U.S.-Dutch MOU. Id. Sixteen of the
Understanding's 30 articles are devoted to the limitation on benefits provision. See Un-
derstanding Regarding the Convention between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., reprinted
in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6113, at 36,435 [hereinafter U.S.-Neth. Understanding].
151. See DeCarlo, supra note 144, at 272 (attributing complexity to numerous qual-
ifications, exceptions, and modifications, as well as abundant definitions and other
cross-references); Kerry L. Plutte, The New Dutch Treat: Are You Ready to Pay Your Share?,
J. EUR. Bus., May-June 1993, at 12 (noting that Dutch holding companies must satisfy
complex, restrictive, and unclear tests); Edward Troup, Of Limited Benefit: Article 26 of
the New U.S./Netherlands Double Tax Treaty Considered, 3 BRIT. TAx REv. 97, 98 (1993)
(noting that exodus from single page test was accomplished in "spectacular fashion").
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rated into most tax statutes. 153 This limitation on benefits provi-
sion embodies both the U.S. desire to combat treaty shopping
and the Dutch apprehension that a revised provision would have
an adverse impact upon a substantial segment of their econ-
omy. 154
A. Safe Harbors Provided Under Objective Tests
The technically elaborate Convention proffers taxpayers,
courts, administrative bodies, and prospective U.S. treaty signa-
tories an opportunity to delve into a limitation on benefits provi-
sion that clarifies a developing body of law. 5' Article 26 repre-
sents a new level of sophistication in international tax treaties. 56
This provision, similar to other limitation on benefits articles,
restricts the eligibility for treaty benefits to bona fide resi-
dents.157
Dutch and American entities that fit into one of the self-
executing objective tests will be accorded treaty benefits.158
Non-qualifying entities will be forced to find favor with the com-
petent tax authority of the source-country. 159 Analogous to the
U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, 6 ° benefits are allowed under the Convention
if the resident is an individual,' 6' a Contracting State, a political
subdivision, a local authority, 6 2 or if the resident is a not-for-
152. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 59, 32
I.L.M. at 486.
153. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51 (describing language as "turgid,
mind-numbing prose"). The provision's intricacy necessitates its own glossary. Id.; see
U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 18, S. TRATv Doc. No. 6, at 76-82, 32 I.L.M. at
494-96.
154. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 52 (discussing U.S.-Dutch solution to
"very nettlesome issue").
155. See supra note 19 (discussing flexible and predictable application for bona
fide residents of Contracting States).
156. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 59, 32
I.L.M. at 486.
157. See U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at 19 (stating that "[b]enefits are be-
stowed only upon those treaty country residents with a sufficient additional nexus, be-
yond simple residence, to the treaty country").
158. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 56 (discussing objective rules).
159. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 76,
32 I.L.M. at 493-94 (stating subjective rule).
160. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing qualified residents
under U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty).
161. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 1(a), S. TEATY Doc. No. 6, at 60,
32 I.L.M. at 487.
162. Id. art. 26, 1 1(b), S. TRErT Doc. No. 6, at 60, 32 I.L.M. at 487.
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profit, tax exempt organization that also satisfies an ownership
test.16 The remaining entities, including Dutch holding compa-
nies, must either: (1) satisfy a publicly traded test; (2) satisfy a
test for subsidiaries of public companies; (3) hold more than a
fifty percent ownership stake and satisfy a base erosion test; (4)
conduct an active trade or business; or (5) satisfy a headquarters
test. 164
1. Publicly Traded Entities
A public company is entitled to treaty benefits if a sufficient
number of that company's shares are traded actively enough on
an acceptable stock exchange. 165 Although similar to the lan-
guage in paragraph 1 (d) of the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty,166 the Con-
vention's public company test more closely resembles section
884 of the I.R.C. 16 7 Under the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, an en-
tity need only rebut evidence 16 that it has engaged in a pattern
of trading.169
163. Id. art. 26, 1(e), S. TREAv Doc. No. 6, at 62, 32 I.L.M. at 487-88.
164. See U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at 106-21 (describing objective tests of
Convention).
165. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1(c)(i), S. TREATrv Doc. No. 6, at
60, 32 I.L.M. at 487. A company is granted treaty benefits if "the principal class of its
shares is listed on a recognized stock exchange located in either of the States and is
substantially and regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges...." Id.
For a detailed examination of the U.S.-Dutch public company test, see Bennett & Morri-
son, supra note 8, at 56-57 (commenting that most public companies will easily qualify
under this test); DeCarlo, supra note 144, at 274-75 (labeling this test as more detailed
and specific than comparable tests in previous provisions).
166. See supra note 134 (stating U.S.-F.R.G. test).
167. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(d) (3), (4).
168. See U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, art. XXIV, 2 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 6113, at 36,444. Article 24 of the U.S.-Dutch MOU states that an entity "need
not prove that it has not engaged in, but may need to rebut evidence that it has en-
gaged in, a pattern of trades on a recognized stock exchange in order to meet these
tests." Id.
169. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 8(f), S. TiRATv Doc. No. 6, at
79-80, 32 I.L.M. at 495. This section states:
f) The shares in a class of shares are considered to be substantially and
regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges in a taxable year
if:
i) trades in such class are effected on one or more of such stock ex-
changes other than in de minimis quantities during every month; and
ii) the aggregate number of shares of that class traded on such stock ex-
change or exchanges during the previous taxable year is at least six
percent of the average number of shares outstanding in that class dur-
ing that taxable year.
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Article 26(8)(a) of the Convention, mandating that the
class of shares merely represent a majority of the voting power
and value of the company, 7 ' liberalizes the eighty percent re-
quirement under the branch profits tax."7 However, a literal
interpretation of Article 26(8)(a) and (b) adversely affects
Dutch public companies because their depository receipts can-
not represent a majority of the voting shares.' 7 2 Finally, cogni-
zant of the participation of the Netherlands in the EC,7 3 the
U.S.-Dutch MOU adds the stock exchanges of Frankfurt,
London, and Paris to the list of permissible stock exchanges
under subparagraph 8 (d) (iv) of Article 26.17"
2. Subsidiaries of Public Companies
The test for subsidiaries, under Article 26, is considerably
For purposes of this subparagraph, any pattern of trades conducted in order
to meet the "substantial and regular trading" tests will be disregarded.
Id. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(d)(4)(B)(2). The branch profits tax requires that at
least 10% of the average number of shares outstanding in that class during the taxable
year are traded. Id.
170. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 8(a), S. TRaxrv Doc. No. 6, at
76-77, 32 I.L.M. at 494. This section provides:
The term "principal class of shares" is generally the ordinary or common
shares of the company, provided that such class of shares represents the major-
ity of the voting power and value of the company. When no single class of
shares represents the majority of the voting power and value of the company,
the "principal class of shares" is generally those classes that in the aggregate
possess more than 50 percent of the voting power and value of the company.
Id.
171. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(d) (4).
172. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 8(a), (b), S. TrEATv Doc. No. 6,
at 76-77, 32 I.L.M. at 494. Dutch companies are often owned by foundations ("stricht-
ingen"), which issue depository receipts ("certificates"). DeCarlo, supra note 144, at
274. Under this scenario, the voting power is retained by the foundation, and the equi-
table interest in the shares is vested in the holder of the receipts. Id. Although the
depository receipts are recognized as shares under Article 26(8) (b), this class of shares
does not represent the majority of the voting power and value of the company as re-
quired under Article 26(8)(a). See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 8(a), S.
TRpAwy Doc. No. 6, at 76-77, 32 I.L.M. at 494. The Convention's Agreed Minutes suc-
cessfully remedied an inevitable predicament. See Sleurink, supra note 148, at 25 (not-
ing that this uncertainty was removed by providing that holders of depository receipts
or trust certificates will be considered to have voting power with respect to such shares).
173. See Sleurink & Andersen, supra note 20, at 212 (noting that this is first U.S.
tax convention that accounts for EC membership).
174. U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, art. XXII, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
6113, at 36,443 (noting that competent tax authorities may add or remove stock ex-
changes from list).
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less stringent than analogous provisions in TRA '8617' and H.R.
5270.176 This relaxed test presents a two-part analysis that hin-
ders clearly abusive situations.177 The first part applies to both
Dutch and U.S. subsidiaries of publicly traded companies.1 78
The initial determination examines whether more than fifty per-
cent of a subsidiary's stock is owned by five or fewer companies
with residency in either the United States or the Netherlands.
17 9
The second test, unique to this anti-treaty shopping provision,
applies only to Dutch corporations and addresses Dutch mem-
bership in the EC."8° Ownership of the subsidiary by residents of
the Netherlands must equal at least thirty percent.1 8 ' Further-
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(d)(1)(ii). A subsidiary, under the branch profits tax, is
a qualified resident if:
At least 90 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of
such foreign corporation entitled to vote and at least 90 percent of the total
value of the stock of such foreign corporation is owned... by a foreign corpo-
ration that is a resident of the same foreign country or a domestic corporation
and the stock of such parent corporation is primarily and regularly traded on
an established securities market in that foreign country or in the United
States, or both.
Id.
176. See H.R. 5270, supra note 119, § 302, at 70. A subsidiary, under H.R. 5270,
would qualify under one of three formidable tests. Id. First, its interests "are primarily
and regularly traded on an established securities market in such country . . . ." Id.
§ 302(c) (3) (B) (i), at 72. Second, at least 50% of the parent's shareholders are resi-
dents of that country. Id. § 302(c) (3) (A) (i), at 71. Finally, if the subsidiary is "wholly
owned by another foreign entity which is organized in such foreign country and the
interest in which are so traded" and it is not base eroding. Id. § 302(c) (3) (A) (ii),
(B) (ii), at 72.
177. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 1(c)(ii)-(iv), S. TrATY Doc.
No. 6, at 60-61, 32 I.L.M. at 487. The U.S.-Dutch compromise, between full and no
application of the base erosion test to subsidiaries, is yet another factor that distin-
guishes the Convention from the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty. See U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note
123, art. 28, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, at 73-75, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 3249.57, at 28,166
(lacking subsidiary test).
178. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 (c) (ii), S. TRETY Doc. No. 6,
at 60, 32 I.L.M. at 487.
179. Id. art. 26,1 1 (c) (ii) (A), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 60, 32 I.L.M. at 487. This
section grants benefits if "more than 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of all of
[the company's] shares is owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer companies which
are resident of either State, the principal classes of the shares of which are listed and
traded as described in subparagraph (c) (i) . . . ." Id. All companies in the chain of
ownership that are used to satisfy the ownership requirements of this subparagraph
must meet the residency requirements. Id. art. 26, 1 8(k), S. TRATY Doc. No. 6, at 81,
32 I.L.M. at 496.
180. Id. art. 26, 1(c) (iii), S. TarTY Doc. No. 6, at 60-61, 32 I.L.M. at 487.
181. Id. art. 26, 1 (c) (iii) (A), S. TRArTY Doc. No. 6, at 60-61, 32 I.L.M. at 487.
This test requires that "at least 30 percent of the aggregate vote and value of all of [the
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more, seventy percent or more of the aggregate vote and value
of all shares must be controlled by residents of the United States
or by EC members. 182
In addition to the elements set forth, neither the subsidiary
nor the company, under either test, may constitute a conduit
company.183 A conduit company, under paragraph 8(m) of Arti-
cle 26, makes interest and royalty payments in excess of ninety
percent of the aggregate receipts of such items during the same
taxable year.' 84 However, benefits of the Convention will still be
granted to a conduit company if it fulfills a diluted base erosion
test as defined in paragraph 5(d)."85
Dutch company's] shares is owned, directly or indirectly, by five or fewer companies
resident in the Netherlands, the principal classes of the shares of which are listed and
traded as described in subparagraph (c) (i) .... " Id.
182. Id. art. 26, 1 1 (c) (iii) (B), S. TEAw Doc. No. 6, at 61, 32 I.L.M. at 487. This
section requires that
[A] t least 70 percent of the aggregate vote and value of all of its shares owned,
directly or indirectly, by five or fewer companies that are residents of the
United States or of member states of the European Communities, the princi-
pal classes of shares of which are substantially and regularly traded on one or
more recognized stock exchanges ....
Id.
183. Id. art. 26, l(c)(ii)(B), (iii)(C), S. TPAwI Doc. No. 6, at 60-61, 32 I.L.M. at
487. Both sections state that the company cannot be a conduit company, as defined in
subparagraph 8(m). Id.
184. Id. art. 26, 1 8(m), S. TPxrEAT Doc. No. 6, at 82, 32 I.L.M. at 496. This para-
graph provides:
For purposes of subparagraph (1) (c) (ii) (B) and (1) (c) (iii) (C), the term
"conduit company" means a company that makes payments of interest, royal-
ties and any other payments included in the definition of deductible payments
(as defined in subparagraph (5) (c)) in a taxable year in an amount equal to or
greater than 90 percent of its aggregate receipts of such items during the same
taxable year.
Id. This test was most likely created to cover Dutch financing intermediaries. See
Spector, supra note 48, at 165 (noting that bulk of income and expense for financing
companies is interest and royalties). However, this test may cause unintended results if
the interest and royalty expense is small in relation to the company's overall income
and expense. See id. (discussing that company with interest income of U.S.$1,000 and
interest expense of U.S.$1,000, with no other deductible payments made or received, is
a conduit company even if company has operating income of U.S.$1,000,000 for year).
In addition, a bank or insurance company will be able to avoid the conduit test by
showing that it is actively engaged in the conduct of its trade and is controlled by associ-
ated enterprises that are qualified persons. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1
8(m)(i), (ii), S. TREry Doc. No. 6, at 82, 32 I.L.M. at 496.
.185. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 (c) (iv), S. TRAwr Doc. No. 6 at
61, 32 I.L.M. at 487. This section provides that "in the case of a conduit company (as
defined in paragraph 8 (m)) that satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (c) (ii) (A)
or (c) (iii) (A) and (B), such company satisfies the conduit base reduction test set forth
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3. Fifty Percent Ownership Test and Fifty Percent Base
Erosion Test
The two-part test that appears in the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty,186
the branch profits tax regulations, 187 and H.R. 5270,188 emerges
once again in Article 26.189 While leaving the ownership test vir-
tually unchanged,19 ° the base erosion test receives three signifi-
cant additions.19' First, in recognition of the increasing unity in
the EC, the test permits a resident of the Netherlands to make
deductible payments of less than seventy percent of gross in-
come to non-qualified persons.192 However, if these payments
are not made to qualified residents nor citizens of the EC, the
distribution must be less than thirty percent of gross income. 93
Second, the applicable gross income constitutes the greater of
the gross income from the previous year or the average gross
income over the previous four years.'94 The final, and perhaps
in paragraph 5(d)." Id.; see id. art. 26, 5(d), S. TREAY Doc. No. 6, at 74-75, 32 I.L.M.
at 493 (counting only deductible payments made to associated enterprises and denying
benefits only if tax burden in third-country is less than 50% of the rate in residence-
state); Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 59 (describing this special test as "quite
watered down" in comparison to regular base erosion safe harbor).
186. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that foreign ownership and
base erosion test must be satisfied under U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty).
187. See supra note 106 (noting that section 884(e) (4) (A) of I.R.C. requires fulfill-
ment of one of two tests).
188. See supra note 121 (discussing that entity, under H.R. 5270, must satisfy base
erosion or foreign ownership rule).
189. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 (d)(i), (ii), S. TarAv Doc.
No. 6, at 61-62, 32 I.L.M. at 487.
190. Id. art. 26, 1 (d)(i), S. TrAT Doc. No. 6, at 61-62, 32 I.L.M. at 487. A
taxpayer meets the foreign ownership test, if "more than 50 percent of the beneficial
interest in which (or, in the case of a company, more than 50 percent of the aggregate
vote and value of all of its shares, and more than 50 percent of the shares of any "dispro-
portionate class of shares") is owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified persons ...
Id.
191. Id. art. 26, 5(a), S. TlEATY Doc. No. 6, at 73, 32 I.L.M. at 492. The basic
base erosion test remains unaltered. Id. art. 26, 1 5(a) (i), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 73,
32 I.L.M. at 492. See Goossen, supra note 30, at 45 (stating that base reduction test "has
developed into the primary basis for the assumption of the treaty shopping motive
192. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 5(a) (ii) (A), S. TrATv Doc. No. 6,
at 73, 32 I.L.M. at 492.
193. Id. art. 26, 1 5(a) (ii) (B), S. TREATv Doc. No. 6, at 73, 32 I.L.M. at 492.
194. Id. art. 26,1 5(b), S. TaRAT Doc. No. 6, at 73-74,32 I.L.M. at 492-93. Subpar-
agraph 5(b) states that
[T]he term "gross income" means gross income for the first taxable year pre-
ceding the current taxable year; provided that the amount of gross income for
the first taxable year preceding the current taxable year will be deemed to be
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most notable, modification is that the deductible payments do
not include arm's length payments for either the right to use
tangible property in the ordinary course of business or remuner-
ation at arm's length for services performed in the payer's coun-
try.1
95
4. Active Trade or Business Test
An entity that fails to satisfy one of the safe harbors articu-
lated in paragraph one of Article 26196 will next attempt to meet
the active trade or business test. 197 Under this complicated
rule, 1 98 the taxpayer must first be engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business in the residence country. 199 This require-
ment may be satisfied by utilizing several attribution rules that
include direct conduct, indirect conduct through a partnership,
and indirect conduct through control of an entity.200 The last
no less than the average of the annual amounts of gross income for the four
taxable years preceding the current taxable year.
Id.
195. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 60; U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art.
26, 5(c), S. TREArY Doc. No. 6, at 74, 32 I.L.M. at 493.
196. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1, S. TREATv Doc. No. 6, at 59-62,
32 I.L.M. at 486-88. These tests include the publicly traded, subsidiary, shareholder
ownership, and base reduction. Id.
197. Id. art. 26, 1 2, S. TR.AY Doc. No. 6, at 62-70, 32 I.L.M. at 488-91. Prior
provisions contain a similar test. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (addressing
paragraph 2 of 1981 U.S. Model); supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing
U.S.-F.R.G. test); supra note 106 (discussing rule in branch profits tax).
198. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 60 (noting that this provision is by
far most complex); Goossen, supra note 30, at 45 (stating that test is "incredibly long
and complex" and "Dutch and English texts seem to be contradictory"); van Brunschot
& van Weeghel, supra note 146, at 204 (describing wording of Convention as "mind-
boggling complexity"). Articles 12 through 17 of the U.S.-Dutch MOU offer examples
of these concepts. See U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, arts. XII-XVII, 2 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 6113, at 36,438-41.
199. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 2(a), S. TREAY Doc. No. 6, at 62,
32 I.L.M. at 488. The test initially provides:
A person resident in one of the States shall also be entitled to the benefits
of this Convention with respect to income derived from the other State if such
person is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the first-
mentioned-State (other than the business of making or managing investments,
unless these activities are banking or insurance activities carried on by a bank
or insurance company) ....
Id.
200. Id. art. 26, 2(e), S. TiETv Doc. No. 6, at 66-68, 32 I.L.M. at 489-90; see
Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 64 (describing attribution section as "one of the
more practical aspects" of intricate test); Sleurink & Andersen, supra note 20, at 217.
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method includes upstream, 20 ' downstream,2 0 2 lateral,20 3 or in-
ward 204 relationships. 2 5 The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty strength-
ens the attribution concept alluded to in the second example of
the U.S.-F.R.G. MOU. 20 6
In addition, the taxpayer must satisfy one of two tests. 20 7
First, the income derived in the source-country must be con-
nected, and the income producing activity substantial, to a trade
or business in the residence-country.20 8 In contrast to the con-
strictions of TRA '86,209 the active trade or business test is re-
laxed by including activities that are part of or are complimen-
tary to one another. 0 Whether the income recipient's trade or
201. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(e)(vi), S. TR.AY Doc. No. 6,
at 67, 32 I.L.M. at 490 (extending from person to controlling person). The group,
limited to five persons, must be residents of either the Contracting States, EC, or an
identified nation. See U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, art. XVI, 2 Tax Trea-
ties (CCH) 1 6113, at 36,440-41 (listing identified nations).
202. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(e) (iii), (iv) S. TRErATY Doc.
No. 6, at 66, 32 I.L.M. at 489 (extending from person to another person controlled by
first person).
203. See id. art. 26, 1 2(e) (vii), S. TREAv Doc. No. 6, at 67, 32 I.L.M. at 490 (ex-
tending to persons in common control).
204. See id. art. 26, 2(e) (v), S. TrATv Doc. No. 6, at 66-67, 32 I.L.M. at 489-90
(extending from consolidated group of companies to member of group).
205. See id. art. 26, 1 2(e), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 66-68, 32 I.L.M. at 489-90
(requiring controlling beneficial interest to be held). A controlling beneficial interest
is generally a beneficial interest, held directly or indirectly, representing more than
50% of the outstanding vote and value. Id. art. 26, 1 2(f), S. TrATv Doc. No. 6, at 68,
32 I.L.M. at 490. If a person maintains 50% or less of the value and voting power of a
second person, then the second person's indirect ownership of a third person may not
be utilized by the first person. Id. art. 26, 1 2(f)(i), S. TR.ATv Doc. No. 6, at 68, 32
I.L.M. at 490. In addition, a person must directly hold a beneficial interest of at least
10% in the third person to be considered part of a group that owns a controlling bene-
ficial interest. Id. art. 26, 1 2(f)(ii), S. TREATv Doc. No. 6, at 68, 32 I.L.M. at 490.
206. See U.S.-F.R.G. Understanding, supra note 140, at 5 (stating that "[b]enefits
are not denied merely because the income is earned by a German holding company
and the relevant activity is carried on in Germany by a German subsidiary"); Bennett &
Morrison, supra note 8, at 64 (discussing strengthened attribution concept in U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty).
207. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(a) (i), (ii), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6,
at 62-63, 32 I.L.M. at 488.
208. Id. art. 26, 1 2(a) (i), S. TrATv Doc. No. 6, at 62, 32 I.L.M. at 488. This test
creates a dual requirement. See Sleurink & Anderson, supra note 20, at 218 (discussing
integration and substantiality criteria).
209. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(e) (1) (iii) (discussing "integral part" requirement).
A business is an integral part if it comprises "in principal part, complementary and
mutually interdependent steps ... in the production and sale or lease of goods or in the
provision of services." Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(e) (4) (i).
210. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(b), S. TrATv Doc. No. 6, at
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business is substantial will be determined by analyzing the pro-
portionate share of the activity in the source-country, the nature
of the activities performed, and the relative contributions made
in both countries. 11 An entity can include business conducted
in other EC nations, if its Dutch activity exceeds fifteen percent
of the assets, gross income, and payroll ratios in the entire EC.2 12
63, 32 I.L.M. at 488. Although the Convention does not clarify which tangential activi-
ties will qualify, the first three examples of the U.S.-F.R.G. MOU will provide guidance.
See U.S.-F.R.G. Understanding, supra note 140, at 4-6. These examples, however, do not
make reference to the 'complementary to' concept. Id.
211. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 2(c), S. TREArY Doc. No. 6, at 63,
32 I.L.M. at 488. This general concept is too vague for taxpayers to apply with certainty.
Goossen, supra note 30, at 31. Therefore, the standard to determine whether the trade
or business is substantial will be the Convention's detailed, three-factor safe harbor.
U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 2(c), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 63-65, 32
I.L.M. at 488-89. The test provides:
[T]he trade or business of the income recipient will be deemed to be substan-
tial if, for the preceding taxable year, the average of the ratios for the follow-
ing three factors exceeds 10 percent (or in the case of a person electing to
apply subparagraph (h), 60 percent) and each of the ratios exceeds 7.5 per-
cent (or in the case of a person electing to apply subparagraph (h), 50 per-
cent), provided that for any separate factor that does not meet the 7.5 percent
test (or in the case of a person electing to apply subparagraph (h), the 50
percent test) in the first preceding taxable year the average of the ratios for
that factor in the three preceding taxable years may be substituted:
i) the ratio of the value of assets used or held for use in the active con-
duct of the trade or business by the income recipient in the first-men-
tioned State (without regard to any assets attributed from a third state
under subparagraph (h), except in the case of a person electing to
apply subparagraph (h)) to all, or, as the case may be, the proportion-
ate share of the value of such assets so used or held for use by the
trade or business producing the income in the other State;
ii) the ratio of gross income derived from the active conduct of the trade
or business by the income recipient in the first-mentioned State... to
all, or, as the case may be, the proportionate share of the gross in-
come so derived by the trade or business producing the income in the
other State; and
iii) the ratio of the payroll expense of the trade or business for services
performed within the first-mentioned State ... to all, or, as the case
may be, the proportionate share of the payroll expense of the trade
or business for services performed in the other State.
Id. In contrast, the test under the branch profits tax compares the value of the non-
U.S. corporation to a worldwide aggregate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(e) (3) (1993).
212. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 2(h), S. TRExArv Doc. No. 6, at 69-
70, 32 I.L.M. at 490-91 (providing that Dutch business must exceed 15% of assets, gross
income, and payroll ratios). This election, however, is not overly beneficial. See id. art.
26, 2(c), S. TRxAyv Doc. No. 6, at 63-65, 32 I.L.M. at 488-89. The percentages in
subparagraph (c) increase from 10% to 60% and from 7.5% to 50% when the election
is taken, thereby tainting any advantage. See supra note 211 (detailing applicable per-
centages when subparagraph (h) is applied). In addition, if a taxpayer elects subpara-
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Alternatively, the income derived in the source-country must be
incidental213 to the income derived in the residence-country.
2 1 4
5. Headquarters Test
The final objective test, unique to the Convention, confers
treaty benefits to a company that functions as a headquarter
company for a multinational corporate group. 215 The test, im-
perative for many ordinary Dutch companies, will not extend to
treaty shoppers operating through a Dutch holding company.216
A company with headquarters in the Netherlands will qualify if it
provides both independent discretionary authority21 7 and a sub-
stantial part of the overall supervision and administration of op-
erations2 a in at least five countries.2 1 9 The headquarters cannot
receive more than twenty-five percent of its gross income from
graph (h), the income that is considered incidental cannot be "greater than four times
the amount of income that would have been considered incidental to the trade or busi-
ness actually conducted in the Netherlands." U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1
2(d), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 65, 32 I.L.M. at 489.
213. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(d), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 65,
32 I.L.M. at 489. Income is incidental if the "production of such income facilitates the
conduct of the trade or business . . . ." Id. An example is the interest income earned
from the investment of working capital. Id.; see U.S.-F.R.G. Understanding, supra note
140, at 7-8 (providing illustration of incidental income); Bennett & Morrison, supra
note 8, at 62 (stating that "amount of income that can be considered 'incidental' is
generally left to the amount of strain the word 'incidental' can withstand").
214. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 2(a) (ii), S. TREAv Doc. No. 6, at
63, 32 I.L.M. at 488.
215. Id. art. 26, 3, S. TrATY Doc. No. 6, at 70-71, 32 I.L.M. at 491-92.
216. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 65 (noting that even holding compa-
nies with substantial employees and some real management or financing activities will
have difficulty qualifying under this test).
217. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 3(e), S. TRATv Doc. No. 6, at 71,
32 I.L.M. at 491 (granting benefits if headquarter "has, and exercises, independent
discretionary authority to carry out the functions").
218. Id. art. 26, 3(a), S. TREAv Doc. No. 6, at 70, 32 I.L.M. at 491. Article 18 of
the U.S.-Dutch MOU states that "a person will be considered a headquarters company if
it performs a significant number of the following functions for the group: group financ-
ing (which cannot be its principal function), pricing, marketing, internal auditing, in-
ternal communications and management." U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150,
art. XVIII, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6113, at 36,442 (noting list not intended to be
exhaustive).
219. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 3(b), S. TREATv Doc. No. 6, at 70-
71, 32 I.L.M. at 491. The headquarter test applies if "the corporate group consists of
corporations resident in, and engaged in an active business in, at least five countries,
and the business activities carried on in each of the five countries (or five groupings of
countries) generate at least 10 percent of the gross income of the group . . . ." Id.
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the other Contracting State.220 Furthermore, the business activi-
ties carried on in any country, other than the country of resi-
dence of the headquarter company, must generate less than fifty
percent of the gross income of the group.22'
B. Circumscribed Derivative Benefits For Taxpayers
Uncharacteristic of U.S. bilateral tax conventions, the U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty includes a limited derivative benefits provi-
sion.222 A Dutch company, controlled by a third-country resi-
dent, will be entitled to treaty benefits for a particular payment
of income if equivalent treaty benefits for that distribution exist
between the United States and the third-country. 23 This narrow
test applies only to dividends, branch tax, interest, and royalty
items of Dutch companies. 22 4 In addition, more than thirty per-
cent of the aggregate vote and value of all shares must belong to
qualified residents of the Netherlands,225 and more than seventy
percent must belong to EC members. 226 Finally, the company
220. Id. art. 26, 3(d), S. TRATY Doc. No. 6, at 71, 32 I.L.M. at 491.
221. Id. art. 26, 3(c), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 71, 32 I.L.M. at 491. The Dutch
company meets this test "if the required ratios are met when averaging the gross in-
come of the preceding four years." Id. art. 26, 1 3(g), S. TRATv Doc. No. 6, at 71, 32
I.L.M. at 491-92.
222. Id. art. 26, 1 4(a), S. TR.ATY Doc. No. 6, at 71-72, 32 I.L.M. at 492. The
derivative concept appears in TRA '86 within the factors the Commissioner of the I.R.S.
may take into consideration. See supra note 108 (listing factors). The regulations, per-
taining to section 884(e) (4) (D) of the I.R.C., provide that to "[tihe extent to which the
foreign corporation would be entitled to comparable treaty benefits with respect to all
articles of an income tax treaty that would apply to that corporation if it had been
incorporated in the country or countries of residence of the majority of its sharehold-
ers." Treas. Reg. § 1.884-5(f) (2) (viii).
223. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 66 (discussing historical U.S. opposi-
tion to granting derivative benefits).
224. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 4(a), S. TRATY Doc. No. 6, at 71-
72, 32 I.L.M. at 492. This section will not "help companies qualify for permanent estab-
lishment or non-discrimination protection." Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 67.
225. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 4(a)(i), S. TRArTv Doc. No. 6, at
72, 32 I.L.M. at 492. This section, therefore, will not apply to a Dutch subsidiary that is
wholly-owned by a third-country entity. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 67.
226. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 4(a) (ii), S. TRATv Doc. No. 6, at
72, 32 I.L.M. at 492. The test, however, is further limited by providing:
In determining whether, pursuant to subparagraph (a) (ii), a company's
shares are owned by residents of member states of the European Communi-
ties, only those shares shall be considered which are held by persons that are
residents of states with a comprehensive income tax Convention with the
United States, as long as the particular dividend, profit or income subject to
the branch tax, interest or royalty payment in respect of which treaty benefits
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must satisfy the base reduction test described in paragraph five
of Article 26.227
C. Safety-Valve Under Competent Authority Determination
Treaty benefits, otherwise denied under the objective tests,
may still be elicited through the competent tax authority in the
source-country. 22 This vested discretionary power, present in
H.R. 5270229 and the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty,23 ° was described in sig-
nificant detail in the regulations pertaining to section
884(e) (4) (D) of the I.R.C. 23 1 Although the U.S.-Dutch provision
provides a haven for taxpayers, the permissive language232 en-
ables U.S. courts to find no abuse of the IRS' discretion even
when the taxpayer does not possess a tainted motive.2 3
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the U.S.-Dutch MOU enumerate
relevant factors for the tax authorities to consider when deter-
mining whether to grant benefits of the Convention.234 Article
19 details six factors to be used by the competent authority when
determining whether the establishment, acquisition, or mainte-
nance of a corporation has or had as one of its principal pur-
poses the obtaining of benefits under the Convention. 235 These
are claimed would be subject to a rate of tax under that Convention that is no
less favorable than the rate of tax applicable to such company under Articles
10 (Dividends), 11 (Branch Tax), 12 (Interest) or 13 (Royalties) of this Con-
vention.
Id. art. 26, 4(b), S. TREATY Doc. No. 6, at 72-73, 32 I.L.M. at 492.
227. Id. art. 26, 1 (4) (a) (iii), S. TirATV Doc. No. 6, at 72, 32 I.L.M. at 492.
228. Id. art. 26, 1 7, S. TRATY Doc. No. 6, at 76, 32 I.L.M. at 493-94 (noting that
competent tax authorities in both nations most confer before treaty benefits are de-
nied).
229. See H.R. 5270, supra note 119, § 302(c) (3) (D), at 73 (discussing authority of
Secretary of U.S. Treasury).
230. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (recognizing discretionary power
of competent tax authority).
231. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (listing eight factors).
232. U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 7, S. TRATv Doc. No. 6, at 76, 32
I.L.M. at 493-94 (stating "competent authority shall take into account. .. ").
233. Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 53-54 (noting that since motive is not
determinative factor, IRS may deny benefits even when taxpayer's purpose is pure).
234. U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, arts. XIX-XXI, 2 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 1 6113, at 36,442-43.
235. Id. art. XIX, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6113, at 36,442-43. The six factors are:
(1) the date of incorporation of the corporation in relation to the date
that this Convention entered into force;
(2) the continuity of the historical business and ownership of the corpo-
ration;
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factors evaluate the length, purpose, and legitimacy of the opera-
tions in the recipient country.236 In addition, Article 21 of the
U.S.-Dutch MOU accounts for the membership of the Nether-
lands in the EC by allowing the competent tax authority to evalu-
ate changes in circumstances that disqualify a company from ob-
taining the benefits of the Convention. 37
III. TREATY SHOPPERS MUST COMPLY WITH THE U.S. TAX
TREATY NETWORK UNDER ARTICLE 26
On January 1, 1994, the United States embarked upon a
new era of tax treaty negotiations .2 3  The 1948 Treaty, entered
into initially to protect concerned investors still nervous about
the financial upheavals of World War II, was unable to deter so-
phisticated tax avoidance practices that emerged in subsequent
years. 23 9 The prevalence of treaty abuse hindered U.S. efforts to
formulate a coherent taxation policy with its trade partners and
prompted the U.S. Congress to pass anti-treaty shopping legisla-
tion 4.2 ° The Netherlands, grasping the formidable implications
(3) the business reasons for the corporation residing in its State of resi-
dence;
(4) the extent to which the corporation is claiming special tax benefits in
its country of residence;
(5) the extent to which the corporation's business activity in the other
State is dependent on the capital, assets, or personnel of the corporation in its
State of residence; and
(6) the extent to which the corporation would be entitled to treaty bene-
fits comparable to those afforded by this Convention if it had been incorpo-
rated in the country of residence of the majority of its shareholders.
Id.
236. Id. One question certain to arise under the fourth factor is whether the
Dutch participation exemption constitutes a special tax benefit. See Bennett & Morri-
son, supra note 8, at 54-55 (discussing consequences of this question to Dutch holding
company).
237. See U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, art. XXI, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
6113, at 36,443 (noting that "change in circumstances that would cause a company to
cease to qualify for treaty benefits under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 26... need not
necessarily result in a denial of benefits"). In addition, the U.S.-Dutch MOU addresses
post-acquisition reorganizations. See Spector, supra note 48, at 173-74 (providing exam-
ples). Finally, certain companies engaged in stock and securities trading activities will
automatically be entitled to the benefits of the Convention. See U.S.-Neth. Understand-
ing, supra note 150, art. XX, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6113, at 36,443.
238. See supra note 18 (discussing when U.S.-Netherlands Treaty entered into
force).
239. Edward Cody, Tax Dodgers Bask Under Caribbean Island Treaty, WASH. PosT, Jan.
28, 1984, at Al.
240. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. dissatisfaction
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of an impending U.S. unilateral override of the 1948 Treaty, in-
vigorated negotiations towards a new tax accord. 241 The result-
ing limitation on benefits provision exceeds its predecessors in
both complexity and length. 42 Though far from perfect, Article
26 of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty is an impressive debut for a
contemporary tax treaty that recognizes the EC, 243 addresses the
economic concerns of the Netherlands, 244 and legitimizes U.S.
efforts to combat treaty shopping through its bilateral tax con-
ventions.2 4 5
A. Reaffirming Cooperative Efforts to Prevent Treaty Shopping
The duration of the U.S.-Dutch deliberations highlighted
the polemic nature of the treaty shopping dilemma.246  The
Dutch government refused the rigorous conditions set forth
under Article 28 of the U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty,247 desiring a tax- ac-
cord that recognized its internationally-oriented economy. 248 In
contrast, the United States would not sign a tax treaty that did
not explicitly bridle abusive treaty practices. 249 The incongruous
U.S.-Dutch positions 25° necessitated an intricate, albeit workable,limitation on benefits provision. 51
with treaty shopping); supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (describing anti-treaty
shopping provision in TRA '86).
241. See supra note 142 (describing prior negotiations as lackluster).
242. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing length and com-
plexity of Article 26).
243. See Troup, supra note 151, at 97 (discussing European dimension).
244. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (noting that revisions in U.S.-F.R.G.
Treaty were necessary due to Dutch economy).
245. See Troup, supra note 151, at 97 (noting that United States has been at "fore-
front of attempts to curb treaty abuse").
246. See Goossen, supra note 30, at 15 (attributing delay in U.S.-Netherlands Treaty
primarily to controversy over limitation on benefits article).
247. DeCarlo, supra note 144, at 271 (discussing disparity between Dutch and Ger-
man economies).
248. See supra note 146 (discussing Dutch economy).
249. See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 175 (discussing U.S. Treasury Department's
requirement that tax treaties contain anti-treaty shopping provisions to restrain treaty
shopping).
250. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
two countries).
251. See Tax Conventions With: The Russian Federation, Treaty Doc. 102-39; United Mex-
ican States, Treaty Doc. 103-7; The Czech Republic, Treaty Doc. 103-17; The Slovak Republic,
Treaty Doc. 103-18; and the Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-6. Protocols Amending Tax Conven-
tions With: Israel, Treaty Doc. 103-16; The Netherlands, Treaty Doc. 103-19; and Barbados,
Treaty Doc. 102-41: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 1st
1994] THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS INCOME TAX TREATY 817
This compromise reinforced the role of tax treaties in ad-
vancing international trade and investment." 2 The fundamen-
tal goal of tax treaties is the removal of the adverse effects of
double taxation on the international movement of goods, serv-
ices, capital, and peopleY53 Embracing a unilateral, approach, 5 4
not only places the United States in violation of international
law, 55 but also exposes U.S. businesses to retaliatory legislation
by U.S. trading partners.256 Article 26 of the U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty257 sidesteps the potential predicament of a U.S. treaty
override by requiring a U.S.-Dutch meeting within six months of
the filing of a grievance by one of the countries. 258
B. Restricting Benefits to Bona Fide Residents
The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty forces treaty shoppers to
either restructure their Dutch operations or else forfeit previ-
ously granted relief under the 1948 Treaty.25 9 Since these mul-
Sess. 76 (1993) (statement of National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.) (attributing "diffi-
culty and complexity" of Article 26 to "desire of the U.S. to prevent abuses, and the
desire of the Netherlands to ensure that 'good' investors are clearly entitled to benefits
on the face of the treaty, without need for approval by the competent authority").
252. See id. (discussing negative impact of override by U.S. Congress). The prefer-
able resolution to the double taxation problem would be to empower tax treaties to
operate multilaterally, practical concerns mandate endorsement of the bilateral treaty
network. See Rosenbloom, supra note 4, at 768-69 (advocating multilateral concept).
"Multilaterality" in the intricate area of taxation would require "general standards
rather than precise rules, hortatory statements rather than legally binding commit-
ments." Id.
253. See supra note 6 (discussing removal of negative effects of double taxation by
tax treaties).
254. See supra notes 97-122 (discussing anti-treaty shopping provisions contained in
TRA '86 and Rostenkowski Bill).
255. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing potential breach of
international law). The propensity of the U.S. Congress to unilaterally override existing
treaty commitments through subsequent tax acts has been condemned. See Richard E.
Andersen, A.L.I. Study Recommends Changes in U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, 2J. INT'L TAX'N 253
(1991) (noting American Law Institute's opposition to unilateral override).
256. See Doernberg, supra note 12, at 210 (discussing increase of tax or trade bur-
den on U.S. businesses operating abroad).
257. See U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, supra note 18, art. 29, 6, S. TxrEA-V Doc. No. 6,
at 90-91, 32 I.L.M. at 500.
258. See Seminar, supra note 139, at 107 (noting difficulty in reaching compromise
on treaty overrides). In addition, the U.S. and Dutch Ministries exchanged notes con-
firming "that first both countries should avoid overrides, and second that both sides
recognize that there are changes to national tax law over time that sometimes affect
treaty relationships and may require amendment to the treaty." Id.
259. See Plutte, supra note 151, at 12 (discussing need to relocate or restructure
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tinationals historically paid little tax to the Dutch government,2"
Article 26 will not adversely affect the Dutch economy.261 The
Convention revamped existing tests262 and instituted fresh ap-
proaches to appropriately determine those entities with a suffi-
cient nexus to the Contracting States.263
The consequential achievement of the U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty is its courageous embrace of unchartered analyses in or-
der to allay the diverse concerns of the two negotiating teams.
The innovative headquarters test was drafted specifically to pre-
vent an exodus of the international companies located in the
Netherlands.264 The U.S. Treasury Department's prior refusal to
allow for derivative benefits was successfully mitigated.265 In ad-
dition, subsidiaries of publicly traded corporations must meet
less stringent safe harbors,266 and the previously unfettered trian-
gular structures are the focus of the Protocol.267 Arguably the
most profound achievement of the Convention is its explicit,
though regrettably incomplete, recognition of the Dutch mem-
bership in the EC.268
Dutch headquarters of multinationals). But see Amico, supra note 34, at 1337-39 (ex-
plaining planning opportunities that still exist).
260. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text (discussing ability of holding
company to escape taxation in both United States and Netherlands under 1948 Treaty).
261. Telephone Interview with Frans de Neree, Financial Counselor, Netherlands
Embassy, United States (Feb. 1, 1994).
262. See supra notes 165-214 and accompanying text (discussing requirements
under publicly traded, subsidiary, ownership, base erosion, and active trade tests).
263. See supra notes 215-21 (discussing novel headquarters test). Surprisingly, Arti-
cle 26 does not address abuse through the use of multiple holding company structures.
See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 180 (providing example and noting that in absence of
published anti-avoidance rule these structures will be difficult to locate).
264. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text (discussing headquarters test).
265. See supra note 223 (noting historic U.S. opposition).
266. See supra notes 175-85 (discussing subsidiary test).
267. See supra notes 47, 148 (discussing Protocol).
268. See Reinhard P6llath, Germans Remain Cool About Treaty, INT'L TAx REv., July-
Aug. 1993, at 29, 30 (stating that U.S.-Dutch negotiators should be congratulated for
implementing idea that EC is common market, but also blamed for reflecting idea
vaguely and insufficiently). Several tests in the Convention account for the participa-
tion of the Netherlands in the EC. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (not-
ing addition of European stock exchanges); supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text
(discussing subsidiary test); supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (allowing higher
distribution if resident of European Community nation); supra note 201 (recognizing
European Community in attribution concept); supra note 212 and accompanying text
(discussing election if business conducted in European Community); supra note 226
and accompanying text (examining derivative benefits); supra note 237 and accompa-
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Regardless of the Convention's import, the complexity269 of
several tests will require technical advice. 27" This guidance will
signify increased costs for taxpayers. 271 The eventual effective-
ness of Article 26 of the Convention will likely hinge on how its
tests are interpreted by the respective competent tax authori-
ties.272 The spirit of compromise, embodied in the drafting of
Article 26 and the U.S.-Dutch MOU, portends favorable inter-
pretations for citizens of the EC and other bona fide Dutch com-
panies.273
1. Impact of the Convention on Dutch Economy
Under the 1948 Treaty, the Netherlands was an ideal place
to situate a holding company.274 The Dutch intermediary dis-
tributed most of its income, through deductible payments, to
persons not entitled to benefits under the 1948 Treaty. Compa-
nies from Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan estab-
lished holding companies in the Netherlands27 to minimize the
nying text (discussing responsibility of competent authority to consider Dutch affilia-
tion with European Community).
269. See H. David Rosenbloom, Commentaty, 9 AM.J. TAX POL'Y 77, 92 (1991). The
increasing complexity of limitation on benefits provisions has been met with reserva-
tions. Mr. Rosenbloom stated:
The limitation on benefits article is inevitably difficult to administer. There
has not been a single reported instance in which one of these provisions has
been invoked in the 15 years they have been around. The article was never
intended to require elaborate interpretation, and it was never intended to oc-
cupy substantial time of the competent authorities or the courts. It was in-
tended as a prophylactic device tending to limit treaty benefits in general and
to preclude a given treaty from operating in favor of the entire world. Such a
purpose does not require an Internal Revenue Code in miniature.
Id.
270. See Goossen, supra note 30, at 45 (supporting conclusion that Convention is
"unworkable" because Dutch State Council suggested "to form a joint U.S.-Dutch bu-
reau to assist multinationals with the interpretation and application of this treaty").
271. See van Brunschot & van Weeghel, supra note 146, at 209 (noting that costs
will be "considerable").
272. See U.S.-NETH. REPORT, supra note 13, at 22 (discussing interpretation and
application as potential difference between new treaty tests and predecessor tests). This
conclusion mirrors that reached under the U.S.-F.R.G. provision. See supra note 132
(noting impact of interpretation and application).
273. See Seminar, supra note 139, at 95 (noting that IRS' rulings under similar
branch profit tax tests and IRS' consideration of numerous factors indicate willingness
to grant treaty benefits); supra notes 234-37 (discussing factors in U.S.-Dutch MOU for
competent authorities to consider).
274. See Kral & Serota, supra note 27 at 442.
275. See Ian Dinnison & Trevor Hughes, Aussies Lose Out on Benefit Limitations,
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thirty percent U.S. withholding rate on their U.S. investments. 276
If these same companies fail to qualify under the recently en-
acted provisions of the Convention, their aggregate tax may ex-
ceed sixty-eight percent of profits.277 Notwithstanding the ab-
sence of treaty shoppers forced to relocate, the viable Dutch
economy will not falter.278
2. Potential Victim: The U.K. "Mixer" Company
Several U.K. companies, uninterested in the conventional
aspects of treaty shopping, may be adversely impacted by the
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty.279 In the United Kingdom, companies
are prohibited from obtaining the maximum foreign tax credit
on taxes assessed on distributions of their subsidiary's divi-
dends. 28 0 U.K. companies may obtain lost foreign tax credit ben-
efits by establishing a mixing company in the Netherlands. 281 A
mixing company permits dividends from different sources to
flow into the Dutch holding company, thus enabling the U.K.
parent company to receive dividends from a single non-U.K.
company.282 Though this practice was permissible under the
1948 Treaty, the U.K. mixing company will likely fail the objec-
INT'L TAX REV., July-Aug., at 24 (discussing harsh impact of Convention on Australian
companies with Dutch holding companies).
276. See supra note 14 (discussing U.S. withholding tax rate).
277. See Tripathi, supra note 46 (estimating 12% net savings under 1948 Treaty to
companies that repatriated profits). Soft-drinks manufacturer Yeo Hiap Seng and its
Dutch holding company, Chun King International BV, will be affected by the U.S.-
Netherlands Treaty. Id.
278. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing nominal impact on
Dutch economy). Over the past decade, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Nether-
lands constituted nearly half of the direct non-U.S. investment into the United States.
Robert Haslach, The Dutch Role in U.S. Business, EUR., June 1991, at 30 (reviewing incep-
tion and growth of Dutch investment in United States). But see Paul Lee, Dutch Low-Tax
Reputation at Risk, INT'L TAX REv., Dec.-Jan. 1994, at 19 (commenting that U.S.-Nether-
lands Treaty and draft anti-avoidance laws are eroding the appeal of Netherlands for
international investors). Tax professionals discuss Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium,
and Ireland as potential sites for holding companies. Id. However, the greatest impact
of the Convention on the Dutch economy may have already passed because investors
began planning for the changes over two years ago. Id.
279. See Kral & Serota, supra note 27, at 442.
280. Id. (discussing that foreign tax credits are generally computed on source-by-
source basis). Ideally, a U.K. company would ignore disparate tax rates and apply ex-
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tive tests under Article 26 and be forced to seek an affirmative
ruling from a competent tax authority.2 8 If a U.K. mixing com-
pany is denied benefits under the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, it will
face a severe increase in its tax burden.
C. Article 26 Embraces the Dutch Commitment to the
European Community
One of the notable achievements of the U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty is its recognition of the EC. Despite this acknowledg-
ment, an action for breach against the Netherlands may still ex-
ist because all EC residents are not treated similarly under the
Convention.284 If a case against the Netherlands is brought
before the European Court of Justice, the aggrieved parties must
prove discrimination.285
The appropriate punishment, if the Netherlands is found to
have violated the Treaty on European Union, is difficult to deter-
mine.286 The penalties range from remuneration for the parties
injured to the foolhardy revocation of the Convention in its en-
tirety.287 Pragmatically, the absence of a common EC tax treaty
policy towards non-members28 necessitates the continued rene-
gotiation of U.S. bilateral treaties in order to prevent the adop-
tion of a stringent, unilateral anti-treaty shopping provision.289
283. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing discretionary author-
ity).
284. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (discussing potential breach of
Article 67 of EEC Treaty by U.S.-F.R.G. Treaty).
285. Council Directive No. 88/361, O.J. L 178/5 (1988). The Court of Justice will
not adjudge an infraction unless the limitation on benefits provision contradicts the
language of a particular Directive. Troup, supra note 151, at 102. The Council Direc-
tive ofJune 24, 1988 was drafted "to attain the highest possible degree of liberalization
in respect of the movement of capital between [EC] residents .... ." Council Directive
No. 88/361, OJ. L 178/5, at 6 (1988). Article 1 of the Directive states that "Member
States shall abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking place between persons
resident in.Member States." Id. art. 1, 1, OJ. L 178/5, at 6 (1988). A future com-
plaint will likely employ this Directive. See Troup, supra note 151, at 103 (declaring that
"prima facie" case for breach exists and discussing discrepancies in what constitutes
discrimination). The Court of Justice may require proof of either egregious bias or the
mere uncertainty facing EC residents. Id.
286. See Troup, supra note 151, at 104 (noting difficulty in determining what con-
sequences would be if Netherlands were found guilty of discriminatory treatment).
287. See Seminar, supra note 139, at 108-09.
288. See loannou, supra note 34, at 50 (discussing accord of EC on most issues,
except taxes, which member countries still control). The Treaty of Maastricht failed to
establish a unified tax policy. Id.
289. See Seminar, supra note 139, at 109 (discussing likelihood of adoption of uni-
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The U.S.-Dutch negotiators, attempting to avoid the U.S.-
F.R.G. controversy, 290 recognized the EC when framing the tests
contained in Article 26 of the Convention.2 91 Acceptance of the
EC, however, is not comprehensive. For example, under the def-
inition of an EC member state, in Article 26, Portugal is ex-
cluded because it has not entered into an income tax treaty with
the United States.292 Although unlikely that the European Court
of Justice will find that the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty violates the
Treaty on European Union, the conflict has not been suppressed
entirely.2 93 Nevertheless, the Convention and the recent double
taxation convention between the United States and Mexico
294
manifest a friendlier U.S. policy aimed at granting treaty benefits
to companies substantially owned by third-country residents that
lateral legislation by U.S. Congress if tax treaty negotiations falter). The U.S. has begun
tax treaty negotiations with Belgium, Ireland, and Portugal. Goossen, supra note 30, at
15 n.14.
290. Tax Treaties: Netherlands' First Chamber Ratifies U.S. Tax Treaty Despite Contro-
versy, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 225, at G-5 (Nov. 24, 1993). The Dutch Association of
Tax Advisers expressed reservations in a letter to the Finance Committee of the First
Chamber. Id. One of the specific concerns of the association was that "[t]he treaty is a
violation of the European Community treaty, since not all EC members would be
treated as qualifying shareholders in the limitation of [sic] benefits article." Id.; see Ei-
lers & Brfigmann, supra note 126, at 20 (commenting that U.S.-F.R.G.. Treaty violates
applicable EC law).
291. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, S. TRA.TY Doc. No. 6, at 59, 32
I.L.M. at 486. Article 21 of the U.S.-Dutch MOU states:
[T]he legal requirements for the facilitation of the free flow of capital and
persons within the European Communities, together with the differing inter-
nal income tax systems, tax incentive regimes, and existing tax treaty policies
among member states of the European Community, will be considered.
U.S.-Neth. Understanding, supra note 150, art. XXI, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6113, at
36,443; see supra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing Convention's recognition
of Dutch participation in EC).
292. See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, supra note 18, art. 26, 1 8(h), S. TRE.Av Doc. No. 6 at
80, 32 I.L.M. at 495 (stating that "It]he term 'member state of the European Communi-
ties' means, unless the context requires otherwise: (i) the Netherlands; and (ii) any
other member state of the European Communities with which both States have in effect
a comprehensive income tax Convention). Another restriction appears under the de-
rivative benefits test. See supra note 226 (counting ownership of residents of countries
with U.S. bilateral treaties with tax rate no less favorable than Convention rate).
293. See DeCarlo, supra note 144, at 279-80 (discussing possible violation of EEC
Treaty).
294. See Convention between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992,
U.S.-Mex., S. TrATv Doc. No. 7, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 2 Tax Trea-
ties (CCH) 1 5903, at 35,807.
1994] THE U.S.-NETHERLANDS INCOME TAX TREATY 823
belong to a regional organization.295
D. A New Era in U.S. Tax Treaty Policy
The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, notwithstanding its implicit
purpose, will serve a meaningful role in the drafting of future
limitation on benefits provisions. 96 U.S. and Dutch taxpayers
are now equipped with objective, self-executing safe harbors that
can be applied with greater certainty than its predecessors.2 97
The extraordinary detail in the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, though
unlikely to be adopted fully in future U.S. tax treaties, illumi-
nates an undeveloped body of law.298 One questionable trend in
U.S. tax conventions is the reliance on administrative authori-
ties. The increasing dependence on the discretionary rulings of
competent tax authorities minimizes the primary role of the ob-
jective tests and enables these bureaucrats to become law mak-
ers. 299 The U.S. Treasury Department now has an opportunity
to forge an authoritative tax treaty policy that embraces and de-
velops both detailed objective tests to facilitate compliance 300
and circumscribed subjective determinations to avoid an auto-
matic set of rules that could result in unfair decisions.
295. See Barry M. Cass & Richard E. Andersen, U.S.-Mexico Treaty Combines Developed
and Developing Country Models, 3 J. Iwr'L TAX'N 197, 201-02 (1992). Under the U.S.-
Mexico Treaty, citizens of North American Free Trade Agreement countries are
treated, with certain restrictions, as functional equivalents of residents of Contracting
States. Id.
296. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 68 (discussing aspects that "may serve
the U.S. Treasury well in the future"); Goossen, supra note 30, at 15-16 (noting that
Article 26 will be used as model during negotiations with other EC nations and will be
incorporated into new U.S. Model Treaty).
297. See Bennett & Morrison, supra note 8, at 51-52 (discussing that increased de-
tail makes "self-executing 'safe harbors' more safe and more self-executing than they
would otherwise be"). The Convention, unlike prior treaties, provides a mechanical
three-factor test to determine if a taxpayer's activities are substantial. See supra note 211
(discussing formula that includes ratios of the value of assets, gross income, and payroll
expense).
298. But see Goossen, supra note 30 (noting that "extreme intricacy... will result,
unintentionally, in an even more restricted application of the treaty").
299. See Eilers & Brfigmann, supra note 126, at 18-19 (noting that U.S.-F.R.G.
Treaty "granted both tax administrations impermissibly broad and constitutionally
questionable discretionary powers"); P6llath, supra note 268, at 31 (discussing problems
with excessive reliance on administrative authority).
300. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing ineffectiveness of 1981
U.S. Model Treaty due to absence of definitions). Nevertheless, the active business test
would benefit from simplification. See supra note 198 (noting complexity).
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CONCLUSION
As critics lament over the length and complexity of Article
26 of the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, this limitation on benefits
provision will have a significant impact on hindering treaty shop-
ping. Multinationals that have procured favorable treaty bene-
fits through Dutch intermediaries will have to reconsider the
Netherlands as the preeminent location for their holding com-
panies. The U.S.-Netherlands Treaty protects the U.S. tax base
and encourages productive negotiations focused on effecting fu-
ture income tax conventions. These bilateral treaties foster in-
ternational economic growth and frustrate the adoption of un-
reasonable unilateral legislation by a myopic, revenue-hungry
U.S. Congress. Although questions persist and complications
will arise through the application of this intricate provision, fu-
ture commentators will herald Article 26 of the Convention as
the provision that effectively closed the doors on the treaty shop-
pers.
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